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Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [30] are being more and more used into critical appli-
cation scenarios where the level of trust on WSNs becomes an important factor, affecting
the success of large-scale industrial WSN applications; the extensive use of this kind of
networks stresses the need to verify their dependability properties not only at design time
to prevent wrong design choices but also at runtime in order to make a WSN more robust
against failures that may occur during its operation.
Examples are target tracking, environmental monitoring (e.g. detection of fires in forests [5]),
structural monitoring of civil engineering structures [146], health monitoring (in medical
scenarios) [67, 114] and patient monitoring [44] by means of Ambient Intelligence (AmI[1])
systems. Depending on application scenarios, different dependability requirements can be
defined, such as, node lifetime, network resiliency, and coverage of the monitoring area. The
work presented in [36] evidenced that also in a simple deployment, a single node can be
responsible of the failure of a huge piece of the network. For instance, a node that is close
to the sink (i.e., the gateway of the WSN that has the role to collect all of the measures
detected by the sensors) is more likely to fail due to the great solicitations it is subjected
to, and its failure would likely cause the isolation of a set of nodes from the sink. Moreover,
the correct operation of a WSN can be affected by other several undesired events, such as
the crash of a node due to the cheap hardware adopted [136], software errors [41], battery
exhaustion, and the unreliability of the wireless medium. Failure occurrences are strongly
exacerbated when nodes are deployed in harsh environment [117] and these, in turn, may
1
2isolate whole portions of the network or cause packets to be lost during their traversal to
the destination.
If not adequately considered, these events may cause severe failures with dangerous con-
sequences, such as, a health monitoring system not able to report critical alerts about a
patient status to a medical center, or a structural monitoring system unable to report a
developing crack in a structure.
Therefore it is necessary to verify the WSNs at design time in order to increase the confi-
dence about the robustness of the designed solution before putting it into operation. It is
also necessary to monitor the system during operation in order to avoid unexpected results
or dangerous effects. Hence, it is important to verify such networks at runtime to perform
what in the literature is defined continuous monitoring [81].
Formal methods are widely adopted in the literature to verify the correctness of a system
specification. They are a particular kind of mathematically based techniques for the spec-
ification, development and verification of software and hardware systems [70] and allow to
define specifications using a language very close to humans.
However, their practical use for the verification of dependability properties of WSNs has
received little attention, due to the distance between system engineers and formal meth-
ods experts and the need to re-adapt the formal specification to different design choices.
Even if some development teams would invest on the definition of a detailed specification
of WSN correctness properties, a design change (e.g., different network topology, number
of produced packets) could require to rethink the formal specification, incurring in extra
undesirable costs. Nevertheless, it could be very useful to have an unique set of formal
specifications that are able to check the WSN behavior at design time and runtime.
To address these issues, the profuse effort in this dissertation deals with the definition of
formal specifications used for the behavioral checking of WSN based systems in static and
3runtime phases; a set of correctness specifications applied to a generic WSN has been de-
fined using a formal language. Since the behavior of a WSN can be characterized in terms
of an event flow (e.g. a node turns on, a packet is sent, a node stops due to failure, etc.)
we decided to adopt the Event Calculus formalism [124]that allows to easily specify the
system in terms of events. This formal language is event-based and narrative-based, i.e. it
allows to observe the sequence of generated events, given a received event. The narrative is
very useful to analyze the behavior of the network and to indirectly evaluate the metrics of
interest, such as coverage, resiliency, and lifetime. It is considered the DECReasoner [104]
as an Event Calculus reasoner to produce the event traces.
In particular, the main contributions of this dissertation are:
• the definition of the formal specification of WSN correctness as two logical sets: a
general correctness specification, valid independently of the particular WSN under
study, and a structural specification related to the properties of the target WSN (e.g.,
number of nodes, topology, channel quality, initial battery charge), designed to be
generated automatically; in this way, it is no necessary rewrite all the specifications
that are common for every WSN, applying a modular solution;
• the use of specific WSN dependability metrics, such as connection resiliency, coverage,
data delivery resiliency and lifetime, as drivers to guide design choices;
• the realization of two types of verification techniques exploiting the same set of formal
specifications: static verification and dynamic verification. The former analyzes a
WSN during the design phase evaluating the robustness against a sequence of failures
that can occur; instead the latter, by means of a runtime verification techniques,
consists in observing the WSN behavior during its operation and detecting, with a set
of monitors, the occurring of failures in order to provide information about critical
nodes and to perform forecasting at runtime about next criticalities.
4• the development of an automated verification tool, named ADVISES (AutomateD
VerIfication of wSn with Event calculuS), to simplify the adoption of the proposed
approach.
It is conceived: i) to operate in double mode: static and dynamic; ii) to automati-
cally generate the structural specifications given the properties of a target WSN (e.g.
topology); iii) to perform the reasoning starting from the correctness and structural
specifications; iv) to compute dependability metrics starting from the event trace pro-
duced by the reasoner; and v) to receive events in real-time from a WSN to start
runtime verification and to evaluate current and future criticalities;
• the presentation of the usefulness of the approach in the context of case studies, to
show how the proposed framework and tool can help system engineers to take deci-
sions upon key design and runtime questions such as: “How many nodes are covered
in the WSN if a given sequence of failures occurs?”, “How many failures the WSN is
able to tolerate so that a minimum coverage level is guaranteed?”, “How the WSN
behaves, in terms of delivered packets, if the channel quality changes (e.g., to con-
sider environments with different levels of harshness)?”,“What are the current critical
nodes that can compromise the robustness of the network?”.
The ADVISES tool has been designed in order to provide useful support for answering
questions like the ones above.
In static verification, this tool is used to perform two different types of analysis (starting
from the same specification):
1. what-if analysis, to verify how the WSN behaves in response to a given sequence of
events of interest for the designer;
2. robustness checking, to verify the long term robustness of the WSN against random
5sequences of undesired events, useful to identify corner cases and dependability bot-
tlenecks.
In runtime verification, the tool operates as a server that is in waiting for new events coming
from the WSN; it autonomously returns informational messages to the user. For example,
if a node fails in a WSN while it is running, this failure is detected by a monitor which sends
the event to the tool. The tool receives the event and, by means of a reasoning, calculates
the dependability metrics both for the current status of the WSN (e.g. raising an alarm if a
given criticality level is reached) and to assess the criticality of the network, in order to alert
the user about possible future hazardous scenarios considering the new network conditions.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 provides the needed background on WSNs and on the dependability threats
of these networks, then it describes the critical WSN-based applications presenting a failure
modes and effects analysis of a generic WSN-based monitoring system. Open issues are
considered to motivate the contribution of the dissertation.
A description of the main approaches used to assess the dependability in WSNs is given in
chapter 2. The chapter also proposes a comparison of the studied work under most impor-
tant chosen parameters.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the static verification study of WSNs. After giving the defi-
nitions of general correctness specifications for a WSN to detect some failures that can
occur and the definition of structural specification of WSNs, the chapter presents the types
of analysis used for the static verification: what-if analysis and robustness checking.
6The dynamic verification technique is discussed in chapter 4. It first provides the needed
background on the Runtime Verification, then it discusses the concept of monitor used by
the tool to receive critical events. Finally the chapter shows how the tool can be used in a
runtime verification context.
The chapter 5 outlines the ADVISES Tool which has been designed and implemented for
the automated formal dependability verification of WSN at design time and runtime. The
chapter describes the GUI of the tool, the settings, the parameters to choice and all of the
offered facilities. Also, it discusses the workflow of the tool that summarizes the function-
alities of the ADVISES tool.
In the chapter 6 some case studies are shown. The chapter describes and discusses of
the results obtained by some considered scenarios; the objective is to validate the proposed
methodology and the strong novelty of the ADVISES tool at design time and runtime.
The dissertation concludes with final remarks and the indication of the lessons learned.
He who loves practice without theory is
like the sailor who boards ship without
a rudder and compass and never knows
where he may cast.
Leonardo da Vinci
Chapter 1
Dependability Issues of Wireless
Sensor Networks
In last decade Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become one of the most discussed topic in sev-
eral research areas, with increasing interest and strong impact on technological development. WSNs
are are being more and more used into critical application scenarios, such as environmental mon-
itoring or health monitoring where the dependability still is an important issue. For this reason,
dependability assessment is becoming more popular in WSN research activities. This Chapter briefly
introduces the WSNs, the dependability threats for this kind of networks, critical WSN-based applica-
tions. Finally, open issues are discussed motivating the need of the approach presented in this thesis.
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
The main purpose of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [6] as a whole is to serve as an
interface to the real world, providing physical information such as temperature, light, radi-
ation, and others, to a computer system.
A WSN is a distributed system consisting of a set of nodes capable of hosting sensors or
actuators, perform processing and communicate with each other through multi-hop network
protocols by means of that a message reaches its destination after having crossed a number
of nodes.
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These networks are formed by many elements, called “sensor nodes” able to sense phys-
ical features of their surroundings or to monitoring a set of items. WSN nodes transmit
information on environment in order to have a global view of the monitored items which
is made accessible to the external user through one or more gateway node(s), named base
station or sink node(s) [96]. Usually a WSN consists of one base station and a high number
of wireless sensors (nodes).
An example of WSN is shown in figure 1.1.
Sensor nodes are often considered as smart sensors because of their power, processing and
memory capabilities [69, 51, 142, 10]. The small size of sensors (about the size of a coin)
allows them to be easily embedded into materials [142] or deployed in a mobile scenarios
such as remote health care, cars, or floats over water [50].
Figure 1.1: Wireless Sensor Network
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1.2 Dependability Threats in Wireless Sensor Networks
Currently, the provision of appropriate means to enforce and/or to assess the dependability
of WSN-based applications remains an unsolved issue.
The definitions of dependability, its attributes, threats and means, considered until today,
have to be reviewed in the new context of WSNs since they introduce novel dependability
threats, due to their highly evolvable and dynamic nature. Such new threats call for new
means to be adopted to reach an adequate dependability and/or security level.
Simoncini in [129] introduced several drivers for WSN research over the next few years and
he suggested some considerations for future work, with respect to the four main typologies
of dependability means, i.e., fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal, and fault fore-
casting [12].
Fault prevention means are used to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults. In the
context of WSNs, this calls for a formal definition of novel accidental and malicious faults
which may be introduced in a WSN-based system.
Fault removal techniques are instead used to reduce the number and severity of faults. To
this aim, novel statistical testing and robustness testing techniques should be defined for
such evolvable systems.
Fault tolerance means are adopted to avoid failures in the presence of residual faults, which
escape the prevention and removal means. In the case of WSN-based systems, it is impor-
tant to consider that the majority of faults are transient in nature, even if they may lead to
catastrophic consequences. In order to define proper counter measures, such faults should
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be carefully classified and characterized, based on their causes, triggers, and manifestation.
An analysis on such threats is performed in paragraph 1.4.
Fault forecasting embraces the set of techniques to estimate the present number, the future
incidence, and the likely consequences of faults. In the context of WSNs, it could be useful
to define specific fault-injection techniques to build dependability benchmarks to compare
competing systems and architectures on an equitable basis. A dependability assessment
of WSNs at design time could help to increase the confidence about the robustness of the
designed solution before putting it into operation and to detect and remove possible critical
node.
In addition, specific tools for the on-line monitoring of an WSN-based system need to be
defined, in order to statistically characterize the system based on realistic data gathered
from the field of operation. The collected data can then be used to improve successive
generations of systems and to define proper fault tolerance strategies at runtime.
In [91] the energy, the fault-tolerance and the mobility of the WSNs represent the funda-
mental issues to be faced for developing the next-generation of smart environments. In
particular, authors highlight the problem of the high spatial correlation among the nodes
and link failures in these systems, due topological constraints and the common dependency
from external events.
The recently proposed prototypes of WSN-based systems present severe technological lim-
itations, which introduce several threats to the dependability of the overall system. Being
the system usually composed by low-cost, battery-powered and wireless-enabled devices,
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their correct functioning is affected by the capacity of batteries, the unreliability and vari-
ability of wireless communications, the mobility of users, the risk of physical damage, etc.
In addition, the presence of hardware faults, due to defects and interference, and the pres-
ence of residual software bugs further complicate the picture.
These threats are in part discussed in [79], where authors discuss about the limited device
lifetime and communication due to low electrical energy and the poor physical protection
of mobile devices which can make them prone to physical damage, if deployed in a harsh
environment. Therefore authors raise the issue of realizing a fault- and intrusion-tolerant
collaborative data backup for WSN-based systems. They consider a scenario where it is
needed to protect the backed-up data against denial-of-service attacks and availability prob-
lems due to failures.
In [8] technologies based on WSN are considered as one of the key research areas to favor the
development of future healthcare industries. The authors illustrate the state of the art on
WSN-based systems for healthcare with related benefits, issues and challenges. It is inter-
esting to note that several challenges and open research problems for Ambient Intelligence
(AmI) Systems are indicated, in particular for dependability problems. In this work it is
reported an analysis of open issues divided by layers. The majority of dependability issues
result to be concentrated in the physical layer, where the scarce transmission power and
the small size of antennas particularly compromise the resilience of the communication. In
particular, the reduced Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) causes high bit error rates and reduces
the capacity of the network to reliably cover the area of interest. Similar dependability
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issues are discussed for the transport layer. The scarce computation power of sensor de-
vices does not allow to implement complex, reliable transport protocols, with control flow
and retransmission. On the other hand, the loss of even a single packet may result in a
significant hazard. This is a major impairment to medical monitoring systems, dealing with
life-critical data. In such systems, the resilient delivery of medical data could result vital
for monitored patients.
Thus, the research is progressively recognizing the need of novel solutions to build depend-
able WSNs. These solutions mainly focus on two key issues: node failures and wireless
network interference.
Regarding node failures, WSNs may suffer from intentional or unintentional node removal
or unresponsive nodes. A combination of node redundancy and multi-sensor data fusion was
one of the solutions proposed to face these issues [15, 52]. The introduction of redundant
sensors avoids the loss of any data if a node becomes compromised or faulty. In addition,
they can serve to facilitate multiple paths when the routing becomes an issue.
Interference has the potential to cause significant delays and data loss and is a major con-
cern with all wireless devices. Motes can interfere with each other in the WSN as well as
being subject to environmental noise. This is due to the lack of harmonious regulations
and standards, as demonstrated in [65, 132]. A solution would be to eliminate the wireless
aspect of the wireless network [72, 66]. Sensor Network based systems such as MITHrill
[72], SMART [72], and MobiHealth [141] all employ a wired connectivity between sensors
and the aggregate. However, these solutions strongly limit the usability of the system, es-
pecially for elderly people, and makes it hard to interconnect all the sensors to commodity
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mobile devices, such as patients’ smartphones, hence requiring ad-hoc aggregating devices
which increase the overall cost of the system.
Currently, in literature several fault-tolerant techniques for WSN have been proposed. How-
ever, there still is an open issue about the validation method of these techniques both at
design and runtime. Hence, one of the aims of this dissertation is also to answer some
questions such as “Given a fault-tolerant technique, am I able to obtain a certain coverage
value?”,“Is the chosen fault-tolerant technique it convenient? Is it an expensive or cheap
solution?”; an overview of the methods and techniques for the WSN assessment, discussed
in Chapter 2, will help to answer to the raised questions.
1.3 Critical WSN-based Applications
Nowadays the field of WSNs offers a multi-disciplinary and rich area of research, in which
several tools and concepts can be employed to address particular kinds of applications. As
such, many potentials of this field have been under study both in academia and in the in-
dustry. Only recently they have become a technology more envisioned in real applications,
included industrial systems or critical scenarios as a good opportunity to drastically reduce
installation, management, and maintenance costs and related times.
According to the European Commission, Critical scenarios consist of “[...] those physical
and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or
destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being
of citizens. [...]”[111].
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This section focuses on five types of critical WSN-based monitoring systems: environment
monitoring, security monitoring, object tracking, ambient intelligence and health monitor-
ing. On the basis of the context, WSNs may be constituted by of a number of nodes that
can be low in case of health monitoring or high in case of security monitoring or environ-
mental monitoring. Nodes may be distributed on a large region or be inserted in a small
area with high density.
For each application scenario, we discuss if the following WSN requirements are met:
• Coverage
Coverage represents the percentage value of the number of nodes that are running and
connected and reachable by the sink node at a given time. To assure the monitoring of
the phenomena keeping an high degree of confidence, WSN applications set a minimal
value of coverage to guarantee.
• Lifetime
Typically in almost all critical WSN-based applications the nodes are self-powered
since they are deployed in harsh environments, and hence, they can be active and
operating for a finite time. The lifetime metric adopted for these scenarios is defined
as the time until a given percentage of nodes in the WSN goes below a given threshold
[27].
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• Data delivery resiliency
A common WSN is realized to collect data that contain measurements and send them
to the sink node. On the basis of a specific application, it is necessary to collect a
minimal amount of data in order to obtain a correct monitoring (e.g. in case of health
monitoring a WSN equipped with ECG has to send to the monitoring application all
the necessary data thus to have a correct ECG signal).
However, interferences and other types of failures may make necessary a reconfigura-
tion of the WSN topology that may have effects on the data delivery efficiency.
• Timeliness
In WSN-based monitoring applications the several data, coming from the sensors of
a WSN, have to be correlated in order to obtain desired measurements. In WSNs, by
means of synchronization protocols, sensors exchange periodically extra radio packets
to perform continually high-precision synchronization mechanisms that compensate
inaccuracies caused by the oscillators of the clocks.
1.3.1 WSN Dependability Metrics
We define following dependability metrics, already adopted in [55, 137], in order to verify
the mapping with the WSN requirements (excluding timeliness):
• Coverage is the time interval in which the WSN can operate, while preserving a given
number of nodes connected to the sink.
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• Connection Resiliency represents the number of node failures and disconnection events
that can be sustained while preserving a given number of nodes connected to the sink.
• Data Delivery Resiliency is the number of node failures and disconnection events that
can be sustained while preserving a given number of correct packets delivered to the
sink.
• Power consumption is the battery power consumed by each sensor, useful to estimate
the expected lifetime of the WSN.
Overall these metrics allow to evaluate the expected dependability of the WSN in terms of
its robustness to failure events, its capacity to cover a given area, and its duration (lifetime).
Clearly, other metrics can be defined for other purposes.
1.3.2 Environmental Monitoring
To periodically measure meteorological and hydrological parameters, such as temperature,
sound, vibration, pressure, motion of the earth, etc., environment monitoring [128, 56] is
adopted exploiting a number of nodes equipped with sensors to have data of physical phe-
nomena.
Dangerous phenomena, such as fires in forests [61, 40], can occur and it would be difficult to
forecast; thus the role of the wireless sensors is to detect them and guarantee a dependable
delivery of collected data to the sink node. Hence, lifetime and data delivery resiliency
represent the most important requirement for this type of monitoring. Since packet losses
are frequent it becomes hard to have a good level of resiliency because of harsh phenomena
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(e.g., interference, heavy rain, intense cold) which are at the same time the most inter-
esting episodes for data analysis. Moreover, since WSNs are characterized by a multi-hop
organization, typically disconnections of nodes to the sink occur causing a partition of the
network.
Usually wireless sensors used in environmental monitoring are placed in harsh environments
[20]. An example of environmental monitoring is discussed in [144]. In SensorScope project
wireless sensor network is deployed in remote and difficult-to-access places and for this rea-
son it was necessary a helicopter for carrying hardware and people.
1.3.3 Security Monitoring
WSN-based security monitoring applications [25] do not collect any data; the common task
of each node is to frequently check the status of its sensors, and to transmit a data report
strictly only when an exception is detected (report by exception), such as security breaches
or unauthorized access to an environment. Being important to guarantee security [123],
nodes are equipped with backup power sources to address the problem of battery exhaus-
tion. For this reason lifetime in these nodes is no critical as for other monitoring systems.
The most important requirements for this type of monitoring is the data delivery resiliency
since for security reasons data have to be delivered without errors.
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1.3.4 Ambient Intelligence
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) is the emerging computing paradigm used to build next gener-
ation smart environments. It is claimed to provide services in a flexible, transparent, and
anticipative manner, requiring minimal skills for human-computer interaction. Recently,
AmI is being adopted also to build smart systems to guide human activities in critical do-
mains, such as, healthcare, ambient assisted living, and disaster recovery.
AmI is a term coined by Philips management to conjure up a vision of an imminent future
in which persons are surrounded by a multitude of fine grained distributed networks com-
prising sensors, and computational devices that are unobtrusively embedded in everyday
objects such as furniture, clothes, and vehicles, and that together create electronic habitats
that are sensitive, adaptive and responsive to the presence of people [21, 86].
Such systems are be based on a large number of heterogeneous devices, from handheld
and wearable devices operated by users to smart sensing and actuating devices embedded
in the surrounding environment, able to interact each other spontaneously by exploiting
different communication links. In this context, applications have to make effective use of
the resources available on-the-fly, and adapt to different hardware and software, and even
firmware configurations.
Examples of Ami applications are smart offices and buildings [100]. In a smart offices, every
movement of the employees is recorded as well as their location during a certain temporal
interval and the temperature of the rooms in which the employees work.
A survey of the technologies of ambient intelligence systems [43] shows several challenges
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and opportunities that AmI researchers will face in the coming years. The authors orga-
nize the contributing technologies into five areas: Sense, Reason, Act, Human-Computer
Interface and Secure. In the last area, Secure, they highlight some dependability issues; for
example, at the sensor level, the sensor reliability, the error handling process, and the errors
due to misconfiguration can create security vulnerabilities. To ensure security in sensor net-
works, the designer must consider these factors together with sensor communication channel
reliability/availability and sensor data integrity and confidentiality. An ongoing challenge
for AmI researchers is mentioned about the design of self-testing and self-repairing AmI
software that can offer quantitative quality-of-service guarantees and a high degree of de-
pendability.
Currently, in the literature, there is still a lack of a commonly accepted architecture to
build the AmI systems of the future, with predictable dependability properties. This issue
is considered in [129], where the author pointed out the concepts of “architecture” and
“system” need to be redefined in the context of AmI systems, in order to properly define
“ambient dependability” attributes, threats and means.
In [17], authors define a dynamic system able to adapt itself to the current situation. They
claim that, in order to guarantee dependability requirements, the system architecture has
to be manageable, controllable and it has to provide means for the prediction of the system
correctness at runtime. In [108], authors proposed an integrated system approach for living
assistance systems based on ambient intelligence technology. They claim that the construc-
tion of trustworthy, robust, and dependable living assistance systems is a challenging task
which requires novel software engineering methods and dependability assessment tools (to
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validate engineering choices), and novel approaches for dependable self-adapting software
architectures, able to react to changes due to frequent failures and reconfiguration events,
which become the norm, rather than the exception.
Georgalis et al. argue that the most important architectural property in an AmI architec-
ture is the fault-tolerance [63]. The fault tolerance, in the context of an AmI architecture,
has to be able to isolate failures, to eliminate single points of failure, to restart failing ser-
vices before that are used by the clients, and finally to provide mechanisms for notifying
the fault level about the irreparable failure of a specific service.
Coronato and De Pietro [44] pointed out that the design of AmI applications in critical
systems requires rigorous software-engineering-oriented approaches. The authors proposed
a set of formal tools and a specification process for AmI, which have been devised to lead
the developer in designing activities and realizing software artefacts.
Zamora-Izquierdo et al. propose a platform [149] that provides a home automation architec-
ture, called DOMESTIC, able to satisfy current and future needs in indoor environments.
Although the architecture is claimed to be robust and dependable, there is not evidence
nor experimental study assessing the dependability level.
Hence, having analyzed previous work, we can assert that stringent dependability require-
ments are called for the practical application to such domains, since even if a single compo-
nent fails then there may be dangerous loss or hazard to people and machineries. Moreover,
because of mobility of resources [4, 24] and the peculiarities of domains [17], AmI appli-
cations ca be affected by new treats. Dependability requirements in AmI applications to
consider are data delivery, timeliness and lifetime.
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Finally, the attention to dependability issues in AmI systems is also witnesses by recent
European Union initiatives, such as the SERENITY (System Engineering for Security and
Dependability) Project [95] that aims to provide security and dependability in AmI systems.
1.3.5 Health Monitoring Systems
Health monitoring systems have been shown to be effective in helping to manage chronic
disease, post-acute care, and monitoring the safety of the older adult population [49]. They
can help older adults slow progression of chronic disease and ensure continued recovery
after being discharged from an acute care setting. The implementation of such systems is
gaining an increasing attention in the academia and the industry, also due to the increasing
healthcare costs and the aging of the world population [67].
To this purpose, cabled measurement equipment is already used to guarantee reliable and
robust control of vital signs. However such systems complicate patient autonomy and mo-
bility. Hence, wireless technologies and mobile devices are starting to be applied to build
more comfortable and patient-friendly health monitoring systems [114].
An health monitoring system is based on Wireless Body Sensor Networks (WBSNs) [110].
The term Wireless Body Sensor Network was coined for the first time in [147] in order to
define a wireless network of wearable computing devices. A set of physiological sensors can
be integrated into a wearable wireless body area network that can be involved for computer-
assisted rehabilitation or early detection of medical conditions.
The basic structure of WBSN consists on a set of wireless physiological sensors, such as body
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temperature, oximeter, blood pressure and ECG. By means of these sensors, we are able to
monitor remotely a patient (Home Monitoring). It is also possible to use WBSN in helping
assisted-living (see Ambient Assisted Living Applications [45, 108]) and independent-living
residents by continuously and unobtrusively monitoring health-related factors such as their
heart-rate, heart-rhythm, and temperature.
In a WBSN time latency has to be limited and the transmission of the vital signs has to be
dependable. Moreover, coverage is a dependability metric to take in account since WBSNs
are constituted by a very limited number of nodes that can be vulnerable to some failure
(due to crash, interference, etc.). Thus, it is opportune to provide WBSNs of an system
that, by means of messages, alerts caregivers.
Figure 1.2: Wireless Body Sensor Network
Figure 1.2 shows a patient with a number of wireless sensors attached to the body (e.g. a
pulse oximeter, an ECG,...), each of which is connected to a small processor, an antenna
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and a wireless battery, and all together form a WBSN.
Nevertheless, the use of wireless technologies and the adoption of commodity hardware/-
software platforms, such as smartphones, pose new challenges on the correct functioning of
health monitoring systems. Wireless channels can be affected by packet loss, due to shadow-
ing and absence of signal coverage. Smartphones can be subjected to unpredictable failures,
which could affect the correct functioning of the system. Finally, cheap and wireless-enabled
medical devices can exhibit wrong readings and temporary disconnections.
These issues may induce the medical staff to take wrong decisions, e.g., to administer wrong
dosages of medicine, which can happen to be fatal for the patient.
For these reasons, the problem of failure detection and management in health monitoring
systems is starting to be addressed in the literature, especially for mobile systems. How-
ever, several studies are based on simplistic failure assumptions or on basic fault tolerance
schemes (such as, sensor redundancy), which are not assured to cover all possible failure
scenarios. For instance, sensor replication is ineffective against smartphone failures.
To overcome the limitations of current solutions, several reliable mobile health monitoring
systems have been proposed and designed in the last years.
Among different implementations, we chose three of the most popular: the MedApps System,
the Nicolet Ambulatory Monitor System and a system used by the Center for Technology
and Aging.
The MedApps System [57] provides a healthcare connectivity platform that delivers scal-
able and flexible remote distribution using cellular, wireless and wired technologies with
cloud-based computing. This system can work with multiple internal and external devices.
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Figure 1.3: A Mobile Health Monitoring Architecture
Patient data is collected, analyzed and forwarded, via cell phone to servers, guaranteeing a
more robust picture of the patients’ health.
The Nicolet Ambulatory Monitor System [145] combines a flexible, high quality diagnostic
unit, ideal for patients of all ages. It is a flexible, robust system specifically realized to
provide the requirements of long-term monitoring. This system diagnoses patients’ cerebral
function (premature neonates to older adults) monitoring continuously ill patients at risk
for brain damage and secondary injury.
Finally, authors in [62] discuss two areas of opportunity for remote patient monitoring: i)
Patient Safety and ii) Chronic Disease Management and Post-Acute Care Management.
In alignment with the mission of the Center for Technology and Aging, they focus on
technology-enabled innovations, such as wireless connectivity, mainly aimed at improving
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the health of older adults and promoting independent living in community-based, home,
and long-term care settings.
A typical mobile health monitoring system is illustrated in figure 1.3.
In the health monitoring systems the transmission of vital sign data and the alarms have
to be dependable in order to intervene as soon as possible and the time latency has to be
limited and predictable. Moreover, coverage and lifetime of network are important, since
WBSNs are composed by few sensor nodes each of which is devoted to monitor a physio-
logical sign.
1.4 FMEA of a WSN-based Monitoring System
To fill the gap in the knowledge about the possible threats that may affect the correct func-
tioning of a monitoring systems, in this section we present the results of a Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) conducted to identify the failure modes of the main components
composing such systems and which have been already published in [35, 32, 34] and here are
briefly summarized.
The analysis takes advantage of past experience and detailed field studies on the dependabil-
ity of mobile devices, wireless communication technologies, such as Bluetooth, and wireless
sensor networks (WSNs), and builds on such results to propose a comprehensive characteri-
zation of the problems that may affect modern monitoring systems. In [35, 34], the analysis
has been realized considering a mobile health monitoring system (as represented in figure
1.3) and it is based both on previous studies on different system components (such as WSNs,
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smart phones, and short range communication technologies) and on FMEA results available
on some subcomponents, such as devices (i.e. medical devices, environmental sensors, ...).
Firstly some FMEA fundamentals are introduced to better know this kind of analysis and
secondly a FMEA table, produced analyzing a typical monitoring system, is presented as a
guidance tool to direct future research efforts towards the realization of more dependable
monitoring systems.
FMEA fundamentals
FMEA is a team-based, systematic and proactive approach for identifying the ways that a
process or design can fail, why it might fail, and how it can be made safer [84]. To properly
evaluate a process or product for strengths, weaknesses, potential problem areas or failure
modes, and to prevent problems before they occur, a FMEA can be conducted. The pur-
pose of performing an FMEA, as described in US MIL STD 1629 [3], is to identify where
and when possible system failures could occur and to prevent those problems before they
happen. It represents a procedure for analysis of potential failure modes within a system
for classification by the severity and likelihood of the failures.
An FMEA provides a systematic method of resolving the questions: How can a process or
product fail? What will be the effect on the rest of the system if such failure occurs? What
action is necessary to prevent the failure?
To realize a FMEA, the system is divided in components/functions that are divided in
subcomponents/subfunctions; it considers a table in which the rows are composed by the
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subcomponents/subfunctions and the columns represent respectively the failure modes, the
possible causes and the possible effects. If a particular failure could not be prevented, then
the goal would be to prevent the issue from affecting users of the teams in the accreditation
process. The FMEA team determines the effect of each failure by failure mode analysis and
identifies single failure points that are critical.
It may also classify each failure according to the criticality of a failure effect (severity) and
its probability of occurring (probability). There are some motivations why this analysis
technique is very advantageous. FMEA provides a basis for identifying root failure causes
and developing effective corrective actions; the FMEA identifies reliability and safety criti-
cal components; it facilitates investigation of design alternatives at all phases of design; it
is used to provide other maintainability, safety, testability, and logistics analyses. FMEA is
thus part of a larger system of quality control, where documentation is vital to implemen-
tation. In our case, FMEA is useful to detect the main dependability threats which have
to be taken in account to perform dependability assessment of a WSN.
Since FMEA is effectively dependent on the members of the team which examines the fail-
ures, it is limited by their experience of previous failures. If a failure mode cannot be
identified, then external help is needed from consultants who are aware of the many differ-
ent types of product failure.
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FMEA results
In this paragraph the results of the FMEA performed on generic monitoring systems are
presented.
Let us consider a monitoring system (figure 1.4) composed by a number of sensors, a gateway
device (a handheld device) and a remote station; typical communication means are blue-
tooth, ZigBee (within the WSN - Intra WSN communication), WiFi and cellular (external
to the WSN - Extra WSN communication). Data are sensed by sensors (i.e. accelerometer,
light sensor, etc.) and transmitted to a mobile device over a bluetooth network. Afterwards,
data are sent to a remote station deployed, for an example, in an office by means of either
a WiFi or a cellular connection (the remote center location).
Figure 1.4: A WSN-based Monitoring Architecture
Chapter 1. Dependability Issues of Wireless Sensor Networks 29
In this typical network, possible failures can occur in sensors, in the bluetooth communi-
cation, in the mobile device, during the WiFi/cellular communication and finally in the
local monitoring station of the operator. The most frequent failure occurrences have been
obtained from past experiences on real architectures and from the existing literature, trying
to relate failure occurrences with potential causes (faults).
Considering the general architecture, the remote center location is omitted, since it should
be more reliable and under the direct control of the staff, who can immediately intervene
in case of failures (e.g., they can connect to the system using a different machine). Hence,
the focus is on the components which have to be used by other users, who might not be
technology experts and who need to rely on a monitoring system able to work even in case
of accidental failures.
To perform the FMEA four components/functions have been identified [35]: the node (i.e.,
the sensor used to monitor a phenomenon), the Intra WSN communication, the Extra WSN
communication, and the gateway (i.e., a smartphone).
In figure 1.5 an organization of components and subcomponents is shown.
Figure 1.5: Components and subcomponents considered in the FMEA
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Four sub-components/subfunctions have been identified for the node component: the sensor
board, the power supply unit, the CPU, and the OS are the general components of a node,
and their analysis is based on our previous study on sensor networks [36, 39]. The failures
of such devices have been identified starting from existing studies, such as [75, 131].
In table 1.1 the FMEA results are presented. Further it is reported for each failure mode
the related severity and probability of occurrence that are represented by a value between 1
and 4. With lower value we identify a weak severity/probability instead with higher values
a strong severity/probability [133]. For example if a failure is classified with severity 4 and
probability 4 it means that the failure is very dangerous and very probable. But if a failure
is classified with severity 1 and probability 1 then there is almost nothing to worry.
Table 1.1 is structured by seven columns. Every row contains the description of a single
failure mode. So, considering a possible failure mode that may occur in the monitoring
system, we identify from left to right the component (and the subcomponent if it exists)
interested by failure mode, the failure mode, the possible effects of failure, the possible
cause of failure and finally the severity and probability of occurrence, to highlight the more
dangerous and frequent failures.
All of these analyzed failures cause abnormal data readings, or even it can happen that a
value is not received at the remote center location; in this case an inaccurate monitoring
is provided, potentially resulting in a significant hazard to monitored system. WSN-based
monitoring systems must be aware of all the possible failures, in order to react to them or,
at least, to detect them. For instance, in case of failure detection, a possible action can be
to call to the operator or to call to an emergency contact to suddenly check the system and
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Table 1.1: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis of a monitoring system
Component Sub-
component
Potential
Failure Mode
Potential Effects of
Failure
Potential Causes of
Failure
Sev. Prob.
Node Sensor
Board
Stuck at Zero The device is out-of-order;
it does not deliver any out-
put to inputs
Sensing hardware 4 2
Null Reading The device delivers null
output values
Sensing hardware 4 4
Out of Scale
Reading
The device delivers no
meaningful values
Sensing hardware 3 4
Power sup-
ply
Stuck at Zero The device is out-of-order;
it does not deliver any out-
put to inputs
Natural energy exhaus-
tion
4 4
Reset The node resets itself to
its initial conditions
Anomalous current re-
quest that cannot be
supplied by batteries
3 1
CPU Stuck at Zero The device is out-of-order;
it does not deliver any out-
put to inputs
Micro-controller 4 4
OS Software Hang The device is powered on,
but not able to deliver any
output
Operating system’s
corrupted state
4 3
Intra WSN
Communication
Routing Packet Loss The radio packet is not de-
livered
Packet corruption 3 2
Buffer overrun
Isolation The node is not longer
connected to the sink node
Failure of all forward-
ing nodes
4 2
Bluetooth
Stack
Bluetooth
stack failure
A Bluetooth module (e.g.
L2CAP, BNEP, etc.) fails
Bluetooth stack’s cor-
rupted state
3 1
Bluetooth
Channel
Header corrup-
tion
Header delivered with er-
rors
Packet corruption 2 1
Header length
mismatch
Header length deviates
from the specified one
Packet corruption 2 1
Payload cor-
ruption
Payload delivered with er-
rors
Packet corruption 3 1
Extra WSN Communica-
tion
Data Delivery
Failures
The network is not able
to deliver the required
amount of measurements
The number of failed
nodes is more than a
given threshold
3 3
Cellular/WiFi
network un-
available
Monitoring stopped Area without cellu-
lar/WiFi signal
4 3
Gateway Device
(the smart-
phone)
Freeze The device’s output be-
comes constant; the de-
vice does not respond to
the user’s input.
System’s corrupted
state
3 3
Self-shutdown The device shuts down it-
self; no service is delivered
at the user interface.
Natural energy exhaus-
tion or self-reboot due
to corrupted state
4 2
Unstable be-
havior
The device exhibits erratic
behavior without any in-
put inserted by the user
System/Application
corrupted state
4 2
Output failure The device delivers an
output sequence that de-
viates from the expected
one
System/Application
corrupted state
3 4
Input failure User inputs have no effect
on device behavior
System/Application
corrupted state; Natu-
ral energy exhaustion
1 1
Bluetooth
Application
Inquiry/Scan
Failure
The scan procedure termi-
nates abnormally
A Bluetooth module
fails or device out of
range
2 3
Discovery Fail-
ure
The discover procedure
terminates abnormally
A Bluetooth module
fails or device out of
range
2 3
Connect Fail-
ure
The device is unable to es-
tablish a connection
A Bluetooth module
fails or device out of
range
4 3
Packet Loss Expected packets are not
received
Packet corruption 3 1
Data mismatch Packets are delivered with
errors in the payload
Memoryless channel
with uncorrelated
errors
3 1
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restore the normal operation of the system.
At the same time, a dependability assessment tool to be used at design time should emulate
the main failure modes, such as node failures and packet losses, to evaluate the dependabil-
ity level of the WSN against possible undesired events.
1.5 Open issues
The dependability level of WSN-based systems is challenged by severe impairments, due
to their open and evolving nature. An WSN-based system operates proactively, does its
job automatically with minimal human intervention, it interacts with humans by messages,
alerts, and other forms of natural communication and it should provide its service in a
stable, robust and reliable way, even in the presence of component malfunctions, power/-
battery break down, or other exceptional conditions.
Generally, faults in a system are unavoidable and they make a system less available, reliable,
safe and secure. This combination of heterogeneity, mobility, dynamism, sheer number of
devices, accidental failures, and the presence of unavoidable software and hardware defects
makes increasingly difficult to build WSN-based systems with verifiable dependability prop-
erties.
Despite these compelling issues, there is still little understanding in the literature on the
dependability delivered by current research proposal for monitoring environments and on
the methods and techniques needed to build more dependable WSN-based systems in the
next future.
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Dependability assessment of WSNs by means of monitoring systems still represents an in-
teresting research issue on the basis of defined specific metrics.
The aim is to have a support tool that could help to i) calculate the robustness level of
the WSN, i) anticipate critical choices e.g., concerning node placement, routing, ii) mitigate
risks, e.g., by forecasting the time when the WSN will not be able to perform with a suitable
level of resiliency, and iii) prevent money loss, e.g., providing a criteria to plan and schedule
maintenance actions effectively.
It is needed to evaluate the performance and the robustness of a WSN-based system at
design time in order to check the level of the fault tolerance of the WSN and it is needed
to continuously monitor the WSN when it is running to promptly detect the occurrence of
failures. Usually to satisfy these two aims, it is necessary to apply two approaches: the sim-
ulative approach to study the network at design time and experimental approach to observe
the behavior of the WSN at runtime; to rely on only could be much more advantageous
since the same means of verification at design time could be extended to the runtime.
Although various interesting dependability evaluation techniques and tools have been pro-
posed in literature, still there is few attention to define formal-based approaches as alter-
native dependability evaluation techniques able to check the behavior of the WSN both at
design and runtime.
Use of formal verification could represent a crucial key for the dependability assessment of
WSN since by means of specifications, defined in a human-friendly language, it is possible
to build tools that can help a network manager to do critical choices about the WSN to
monitor and to perform continuous monitoring [80] (or runtime verification [143]) of the
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deployed system using the same set of specifications adopted at design time.
Research is the process of going up
alleys to see if they are blind.
Marston Bates
Chapter 2
Related Research
The approaches adopted in literature to evaluate WSN dependability attributes can be categorized in
four classes: experimental, simulative, analytical and formal. The first allows to analyze depend-
ability at runtime, second and third at design time; none of these allows to do assessment both at
design and runtime. Formal approaches offer a new opportunity for the dependability study of WSNs
but until now there is no work that has proven how use a formal method to perform dependability
assessment of a WSN both before and after its deployment. This Chapter revises experimental, sim-
ulative, analytical and formal approaches and tools currently used in the field of WSN dependability
assessment, including related studies; a comparison of related work is presented to summarize the
state-of-art and reason about what is still missing. Finally guidelines to help designers to realize
correctness properties specifications of WSN are discussed.
2.1 Experimental approaches
Experimental approaches are used to measure the WSN dependability directly from a real
system, during its operation. In the prototyping phase, it is possible to perform an acceler-
ated testing, for example by forcing a fault (by means of Fault Injection (FI) [30, 37]); at
runtime, it is possible to collect occurring failures directly from system (by means of Field
Failure Data Analysis (FFDA) techniques [31]).
Fault Injection is defined as the dependability validation technique based on the observation
of the system behavior under the presence of faults which are deliberately introduced into
the system [73].
35
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Typically FI is used to i) assess the dependability level of a target system, such as an op-
erational systems, a system prototype, or an emulated execution environment (the last two
options are used especially in the pre-deployment phase of the system), and ii) to shed some
light on the design choice of a system, for instance, showing its potential dependability bot-
tlenecks. FI tries to determine whether the response of a system matches its specifications
in the presence of a defined space of faults.
Table 2.1: Fault Injection Tools
Tool Technique Fault Model
XCEPTION [92] SWIFI with exception trigger Transient faults
FERRARI [77] SWIFI with interrupt, fork,
trap
Transient and permanent faults
FIAT [14] SWIFI with exception trigger Bit-flip faults in the memory
NFTAPE [135] SWIFI with exception trigger Several types of faults (arbitrary
model)
MESSALINE [9] HWIFI with forcing and inser-
tion
Faults of type stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1,
logical bridging, physical bridging
AVR-INJECT [30] SWIFI with exception trigger Bit-flip faults in the memory area,
code area and special registers
The implementation of tools for injecting faults has been the focus of several studies. Table
2.1 reports a summary of well known tools for fault injection. Beyond their inherent differ-
ences, they operate in a similar way: each of them performs a study of the fault-free target,
obtaining a ’gold file’; then, it injects a fault (obtaining the ’fault file’) and it compares the
gold file with the fault file, to evaluate the system behavior in response to the fault.
Among of the tools mentioned in the table 2.1, there is the AVR-Inject Tool. We have
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implemented this tool [30] to experimentally study a WSN; it has been useful for the real-
ization of the FMEA discussed in the previous chapter. Unfortunately the AVR-Inject tool
cannot be used at design time since it needs a prototype of the system, an assembly code
that runs on the sensors and thus it needs very detailed information in design phase. For
this reason we had to investigate other solutions to reach the aim of this dissertation since
we can use this tool only when a system is in running.
Field Failure Data Analysis (FFDA) [23] of a system represents the set of fault forecasting
techniques which are performed at runtime. By means of this analysis, the dependability
attributes of an actual and deployed system are measured considering real conditions. A
system which is in normal operation is observed and the natural occurring errors and fail-
ures are monitored and recorded in log files.
The FFDA is not practical, not feasible for the WSNs since they do not provide log and
they have to be lightweight [22].
2.2 Simulative approaches
A simulative approach for assessing WSNs usually makes use of behavioral simulators, i.e.,
tools able to reproduce the expected behavior of a system by means of a code-based de-
scription. Behavioral simulators allow to reproduce the expected behavior of WSN nodes
on the basis of the real application planned to execute on nodes. However, it is not always
possible to observe non-functional properties of WSNs by means of simulative approaches,
since models need to be redefined and adapted to the specific network to simulate.
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Typical simulative approaches to evaluate WSN fault/failure models are provided in [127,
82].
In [127] authors address the problem of modeling and evaluating the reliability of the com-
munication infrastructure of a WSN. Authors assume that failures can be categorized in
node and network failures.
The first on-line model-based testing technique [82] has been conceived to identify the sen-
sors that have the highest probability to be faulty. The effectiveness of the approach is
evaluated in the presence of random noise using a system of light sensors; a fault classi-
fication taxonomy for wired sensors is introduced. This technique is not oriented to the
wireless sensor networks.
Some work like [103, 126] provide code generation of sensor network applications to perform
behavioral simulation and performance analysis.
In [103], a framework for modeling, simulation and code generation of WSNs is presented.
The framework is based on Simulink, Stateflow and Embedded Coder; it allows engineers
to simulate and automatically generate code of sensor network applications based on Math-
Works tools. By means of this tool, an application developer can configure the connectivity
of the sensor nodes and can start simulation and functional verification of the application.
This framework is able to generate the complete application code for several target operat-
ing systems (e.g. TinyOS and MantisOS) from the simulated model.
In [126] a model-driven process (MDD) is presented to obtain a major effort of optimization
for WSN applications. In this work a set of modeling languages is the starting point for
code generation and performance analysis.
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Finally, the network lifetime is analyzed in [58]; to calculate the lifetime of a WSN, the
authors perform simulation by means of a Castalia-based approach that models path-loss.
2.2.1 Simulators
Several simulators for WSNs have been proposed in literature, such as NS-2, OMNet++,
Prowler, TOSSIM, OPNET and Avrora, [109, 93, 19, 125, 89, 90, 76, 138].
NS-2 [109] is a event-based simulation tool for WSN. It is amply adopted in academic
research being open source and easy to use. The simulations are written with C++/C
languages and they can be observed graphically by Network AniMator (NAM).
OMNeT++ [93] is a component-based discrete network simulator. Even this simulator is
based on C++ language and it has graphical tools for simulation building and evaluating re-
sults in real time. The most recent simulation environment built on OMNeT++ is Castalia
[19]. This framework was realized for Wireless Sensor Networks, Body Area Networks[148]
and networks of low-power embedded devices and it allows to test distributed algorithms
and protocols for WSN considering some features of a real WSN like wireless channel, power
consumption and considering a real node behavior. Castalia can be used to simulate a wide
set of wireless sensor platforms.
Prowler [125] is an event-driven WSN simulator conceived to operate in Matlab environ-
ment. Initially it was realized to simulate MICA motes but then it has been extended also
for more general platforms. Advantages of Matlab environments are simple implementing
of applications, friendly GUI interface and good visualization facilities. By means of this
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simulator, it is possible to perform deterministic simulation to test application code of a
WSN application and to perform probabilistic simulation to observe the behavior of the
sensor nodes.
TOSSIM [89, 90] is the simulator built for TinyOS applications. Actually TOSSIM is an
emulator rather than a simulator since it runs actual application code; it allows to simulate
the hardware of a sensor but it does not provide information about WSN dependability.
Finally, TOSSIM is provided of a visualization tool, TinyViz.
OPNET [76] is a discrete event, object oriented network simulator. this tool was developed
initially for military purposes but its large use grew as much to be considered also for com-
mercial use. OPNET is a powerful software that it can be used for research purpose and
also as a network design tool.
Finally Avrora [90] is a simulator that adopts an approach which is more oriented to the
verification of behavioral properties or performance indicators, and not oriented to the
observation of dependability properties. Avrora is a low-level emulator of the AVR pro-
cessor mainly used to test the behavior of WSNs application prior to their deployment.
It executes the disassembled code instruction per instruction and emulates the hardware
of the processor and the hardware of the node (memory, LEDs, sensors, radio channel, etc.).
2.3 Analytical approaches
The study of the performance and dependability of WSNs can be performed by means of
analytical models [55, 68, 101, 2, 29, 134, 85].
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Some of these models [54] are based on a mathematical representation of the WSN charac-
teristics and are solved by means of simulation.
In [55] authors introduce an approach for the automated generation of WSN dependability
models, based on a variant of Petri nets.
An analytical model to predict the battery exhaustion and the lifetime of a WSN, LEACH,
is discussed in [68]. In [101] the authors present a network state model used to forecast
the energy of a sensor. AboElFotoh et al. [2] present a probabilistic technique to observe
the WSN behavior and discuss about dependability of a WSN; they suppose that the main
causes of the failures are related to the crashes, power failures and natural causes. The
authors evaluate dependability on the basis of the number of packets received by the sink
in a deterministic time (decision interval). The dependability is computed evaluating the
delay of the expected message.
In [29] authors develop an analytical model to investigate the relation between energy saving
and system performance and to observe the effects when sensor sleep/active mode vary. By
means of this model, authors can obtain several performance metrics, such as the distribu-
tion of the data delivery delay. This work adopts analytical model specifically representing
the sensor in sleep/active mode considering channel contention and routing issues. In this
work authors model a WSN by means of Markovian techniques; they assess dependability
using data delivery resiliency and power consumption metrics.
A linear programming model [134] is introduced to address the problem of “multi-hop life-
time aware routing”. The authors propose a Garg-Konemann-based approach to obtain
the minimum cost arborescence for reaching the sink node optimizing the lifetime of sensor
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nodes.
Finally in [85] the node aging problem is addressed. The authors try to solve this problem
by associating a survivor function for each sensor node (using Weibull distribution). The
aim of this work is to demonstrate that the node aging process has an important impact on
the connectivity at the increasing of the hop distance. By means of a mathematical analysis
and a simulation, they observe that nodes at first hop consume their energy because of the
aggregation with children nodes. Hence, they assert that the consumption is related to the
number of children nodes.
2.4 Formal approaches
Formal approaches are based on formal verification that consists in checking of the correct-
ness of a system taking in account specifications or properties, using formal methods.
The formal verification is performed by providing a proof on an abstract mathematical
model of the system. Typically to model systems we can consider labeled transition sys-
tems, timed automata, finite state machines, Petri nets, process algebra, hybrid automata,
formal semantics of programming languages such as axiomatic semantics, operational se-
mantics and denotational semantics.
2.4.1 Model Checking
One of the well known formal approaches is model checking [16]. This technique consists
of a systematically exhaustive exploration of the mathematical model (this is possible for
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finite models, but also for some infinite models where infinite sets of states can be effectively
represented finitely by using abstraction or taking advantage of symmetry). Usually this
consists of exploring all states and transitions in the model, by using smart and domain-
specific abstraction techniques to consider whole groups of states in a single operation and
reduce computing time. Implementation techniques include state space enumeration, sym-
bolic state space enumeration, abstract interpretation, symbolic simulation, abstraction
refinement. The properties to be verified are often described in temporal logics, such as
linear temporal logic (LTL) or computational tree logic (CTL) [64]. The great advantage of
model checking is that it is often fully automatic; its primary disadvantage is that it does
not in general scale to large systems; symbolic models are typically limited to a few hundred
bits of state, while explicit state enumeration requires the state space being explored to be
relatively small.
Typically Model Checking allows to verify if a defined property of a system is satisfied.
Thus, the limit of this technique is related to the prediction of a sequence of events. In
other words, by means of model checking, an user is able to control if, given an event, the
correctness properties are satisfied but is not able to know what will be the behavior of the
system after that given event which is instead the goal of our verification approach.
In the work presented in [53] authors consider the Approximate Probabilistic Model Checker
(APMC), a tool that allows to approximately check the correctness of extremely large prob-
abilistic systems, to verify it. Instead, we rely on deterministic checking of correctness
properties.
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SPIN Model Checker
SPIN [71] is an efficient verification system widely diffused for models of distributed soft-
ware systems. It has been implemented to detect design errors in applications ranging from
high-level descriptions of distributed algorithms to detailed code for controlling telephone
exchanges. It is a general tool for verifying the correctness in a rigorous and mostly auto-
mated fashion. It was written by Holzmann and others members of the Unix group of the
Computing Sciences Research Center at Bell Labs.
Systems to be verified are described in Promela (Process Meta Language) [98], which
supports modeling of asynchronous distributed algorithms as non-deterministic automata
(SPIN stands for ”Simple Promela Interpreter”). Properties to be verified are expressed as
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas, which are negated and then converted into Buchi
automata as part of the model-checking algorithm.
2.4.2 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
Linear temporal logic or linear-time temporal logic [74, 140] (LTL) is a modal temporal
logic with modalities referring to time. LTL is a formalism used for specification and ver-
ification of properties in reactive systems, as Pnueli defined in his work [116]. A set of
infinite sequences is described by a formula of temporal logic (temporal property). If all of
the computations of temporal property belong to this set then the property is satisfied. The
formulas of LTL are useful to define temporal properties of transition systems [60].
In [11] authors present PARADIGM and adopt a propositional LTL (PLTL) to specify and
Chapter 2. Related Research 45
verify behavior correctness of dynamic systems. They assert that some specifications can
be automatically translated to a PLTL-based program, producing an executable model for
the real system. This model is composed by a set of logic rules implying, at any time, the
current state of process executions.
The complexity of the formulas to define properties in this logic formalism makes more hard
its application. Axioms have to be defined by means of particular logic symbols that make
difficult the understanding. Moreover, since there is not a way to determine if a property is
true or false at given time, the computation of the dependability metrics is more difficult.
2.4.3 Situation Calculus
The situation calculus is a logic formalism designed for representing and reasoning about
dynamical domains. It was first introduced by John McCarthy [97]. The main version of
the situational calculus, that is used, is based on that introduced by Ray Reiter [120].
The situation calculus represents changing scenarios as a set of first-order logic formulas
[130]. The basic elements of the calculus are: the actions that can be performed in the
world, the fluents that describe the state of the world and the situations. Actions can be
performed in the world and quantified. Fluents describe the state of the world (these are
predicates and functions whose value may change depending on the situation). Situations
represent a history of action occurrences [47].
A dynamic world is modeled as a series of situations, resulting from the various actions
performed within the world. A domain is formalized by a number of formulas, namely: i)
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Action precondition axioms, one for each action, ii) Successor state axioms, one for each
fluent, iii) Foundational axioms of the situation calculus and iv) other axioms describing
the world in various situations; in particular the dynamic world is axiomatized mainly by
adding initial world axioms, effect axioms, and successor state axioms. The initial world
axioms describe the starting state of the environment, made up of its objects, their posi-
tion, their properties, and so forth; effect axioms instead describe the effect upon a fluent
of performing an action in a given situation. It is also necessary to specify, for each fluent,
the non-effect of other actions.
The work described in [46] focuses on detecting and identifying dangerous and abnormal
situations - due to patient behaviors - in order to provide assurance to the patient of her
safety and to help clinician to assess the state of the disease. It adopts Situation Calcu-
lus to define correctness properties to model a situation-awareness scenario and the Golog
Logic Programming Language for situation calculus [88] to realize intelligent agents for the
detection and recovery. Situation Calculus and Golog are well known for the specification
and monitoring of the evolving world in case of robots performing specific actions within a
controlled environment.
However the situation calculus is based on global states and the actions are hypothetical
without giving information about time.
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2.4.4 Event Calculus
Event Calculus was proposed for the first time in 1986 by Marek Sergot and Robert Kowal-
ski [83] and then it was extended by Murray Shanahan and Rob Miller in the 1990s [99].
This language belongs to the family of logical languages and it is commonly used for repre-
senting and reasoning of the events and their effects [139]. Fluent, event and predicate are
the basic concepts of Event Calculus [124]. For every timepoint, the value of fluents or the
events that occur can be specified.
This language is also named narrative-based : in the Event Calculus, there is a single time
line on which events occur and this event sequence represents the narrative.
The most important and used predicates of Event Calculus are: Initiates, Terminates, Hold-
sAt and Happens.
Supposing that e is an event, f is a fluent and t is a timepoint, we have:
• Initiates(e, f, t)
It means that, if the event e is executed at time t, then the fluent f will be true after t.
• Terminates(e, f, t)
It has a similar meaning, with the only difference being that when the event e is
executed at time t, then the fluent f will be false after t.
• HoldsAt(f, t)
It is used to tell which fluents hold at a given time point.
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• Happens(e, t)
It is used when the event e occurs at timepoint t.
Since the normal and failing behavior of a WSN can be characterized in terms of an event
flow (for instance, a node is turned on, a packet is sent, a packet is lost, a node stops to work
due to crash or battery exhaustion, or it gets isolated from the rest of the network due to
the failure of other nodes, etc.), Event Calculus, that is an event-based formal language, can
be used to formally specify the occurrence of such events and the response of the WSN to
them, to check if given correctness properties are verified. Moreover dependability metrics
can be valuated by analyzing the narrative generated by a Event Calculus reasoner based
on the specification of the target WSN.
An example of narrative is shown in listing 2.1.
Listing 2.1: Example of Event Calculus narrative
1 1
2 Happens(Disconnect(5, 3), 1).
3 2
4 -IsLinked(5, 3).
5 Happens(Isolate(5), 2).
6 3
7 -IsReachable(5).
8 Happens(Stop(4), 3).
9 4
10 -IsAlive(4).
11 Happens(Isolate(6), 4).
12 5
13 -IsReachable(6).
14 Happens(Isolate(7), 5).
15 6
16 -IsReachable(7).
17 7
18 8
19 9
20 10 
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By the listing 2.1 we can understand that at timepoint 1 there is a disconnection of node 5
from 3 and this event causes an isolation of the node 5; at timepoint 3 node 4 stops to work
causing an isolation of nodes 6 and 7. Supposing to calculate the coverage, we are able to
measure it knowing the number of isolated nodes in every timepoint.
Finally several techniques are considered to perform automated reasoning in Event Calcu-
lus, such as satisfiability solving, first-order logic automated theorem proving, Answer Set
Programming and logic programming in Prolog.
To check the proposed correctness properties defined in Event Calculus we use the Discrete
Event Calculus (DEC) Reasoner. The DEC Reasoner [105, 104] uses satisfiability (SAT)
solvers [106] and by means of this we are able to perform reasoning like deduction, ab-
duction, post-diction, and model finding. It is documented in details in [107] in which its
syntax is explained (e.g. the meaning of the symbols used in the formulas).
2.4.5 Formal approaches for WSN
Lifetime of WSN is defined and evaluated in [26] by means of a mathematical formalism. In
this work a generic definition of sensor network lifetime is presented and it is conceived in
such way to incorporate different application requirements, such as i) number of alive nodes,
ii) time latency in the delivery process, iii) delivery ratio, iv) connectivity, v) coverage, and
vi) availability.
Recently, different formal methods and tools have been applied for the modeling and anal-
ysis of WSNs, such as [112], [94] and [18].
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In [78] authors apply a formal tool to wireless sensor networks. Authors propose a formal
language to specify the WSN and a tool to simulate it. However, the formal specification
has to be rewritten if the WSN under study changes.
In [94] authors propose a methodology for modeling, analysis and development of WSNs
using a formal language (PAWSN) and a tool environment (TEPAWSN). Authors consider
only power consumption as dependability metric that is necessary but not sufficient to as-
sess the WSN dependability (e.g. other problems of WSN such as the isolation problem of
a node have been analyzed) and also they apply only simulation.
In [18] authors describe a model-driven performance engineering framework for WSNs
(called Moppet). This framework uses the Event Calculus formalism to estimate the perfor-
mance of WSN applications in terms of power consumption and lifetime of each sensor node;
other dependability metrics like coverage, connection resiliency and data delivery resiliency
are not considered. The features related to a particular WSN have to set in the framework
every time that a new experiment starts.
There are some papers ([113],[122],[115]) that considered the formal method in real-time
contexts. In [113] authors model and study WSN algorithms using the Real-Time Maude
formalism. Though authors adopt this formalism, they use NS-2 simulator to analyze the
considered scenarios making the work very similar to simulative approaches.
The work presented in [122] describes a new formal model for the specification and the
validation of WSN. Authors assert the use of rigorous formal method in specification and
validation can help designers to limit the introduction of potentially faulty components
during the construction of the system. They consider a WSN as a Reactive Multi-Agent
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System consisting of concurrent reactive agents. In this paper dependability metrics are
not treated and calculated and authors just describe the structure of a Reactive Decisional
Agent by means of a formal language. Also, no case studies are reported to validate their
proposal.
Patrignani et al. in [115] consider policies to monitor wireless sensor network applications
in a WSN middleware characterized by a Component and Policy Infrastructure (CaPI); by
means of a formalization they are able to catch dangerous or undesired effects which may
compromise the correct behavior of a WSN application. In this work it has been developed
a prototype that operates on the basis of a application topology in terms of communicating
nodes and a set of properties to satisfy. Even if authors confirm that one of the most im-
portant benefits of formal approach is that problems occurring at runtime can be detected,
they model a static and not dynamic network configuration, focusing only on security (en-
cryption and decryption messages) and resource usage problems and in their scenario they
do not consider other dependability metrics (coverage, data delivery resiliency, ...).
An open issue with formal specifications of WSNs is that they need to be adapted when
changing the target WSN configuration, e.g., in terms of the number of nodes and topology.
To address this problem, it is necessary to provide separated specifications and thus conceive
two logical sets of specifications: a general specification for WSN correctness properties that
is valid for any WSN, and a structural specification related to the topology of the target
WSN, designed in order to be generated automatically.
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2.5 Comparison of Related Work
In this section it is shown and discussed a comparison of the related work presented in
the previous paragraphs in which it emerges a lack of a work that satisfies all the chosen
characteristics.
By means of the figure 2.1, the analyzed work and their characteristics are reported.
In the grid on the rows there are the approaches, tools and models considered in the related
work; on the columns there are the properties chosen to highlight the differences. For each
work it has been analyzed if some formal method has been used, if it is focalized on WSN,
what dependability metrics have been considered, if specifications have been separated (in
case of use of formal method), if the work is supported by some tool, if What-if analysis
has been considered, if Runtime Verification has been considered and finally if some case
study has been presented.
In particular we have considered the following features:
• WSN to determine if the related work is focused on the Wireless Sensor Networks;
• WSN Dependability metrics to determine if the related work considers the following
dependability metrics: coverage, connection resiliency, data delivery resiliency, power
consumption;
• Formal Method to determine if the related work is based on some formal method (e.g.
model checking, LTL, Event Calculus, etc.) and in particular if the work adopts an
approach that provides Separated specifications: we want to verify if the related work
applies a modular solution considering two logical sets of specifications: a general
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correctness specification, valid independently of the particular WSN under study, and
a structural specification related to the properties of the target WSN (e.g., number of
nodes, topology, channel quality, initial battery charge);
• Tool to determine if the related work proposes a novel tool to support designers;
• What-if analysis to determine if in the related work the target system is observed
under precise circumstances;
• RV to determine if the related work proposes a runtime verification technique;
• Case study to determine if the related work considers case studies in order to validate
the proposed work.
From the survey of the literature it is possible to assert that few apply formal approaches
to study the behavior of WSN from the same perspective we do in this work. Among the
most important dependability metrics, the power consumption is the only one that has
been considered extensively, instead data delivery resiliency and connection resiliency are
the least analyzed.
Let us note that for APMC work it is not possible to consider it as contribution for WSN
since authors assess data delivery resiliency and power consumption for cabled sensor net-
works.
The majority of papers propose a tool and present results by means of a case study applying
what-if analysis.
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There is no work that considers specifications defined separately (see the Separated speci-
fications column); this is a disadvantage that it will be overcome with the ADVISES tool
proposed in the next chapters: in fact ADVISES tool it is the first work that considers sep-
arated specifications considering the general specifications on one side and the structural
specifications dependent on the WSN topology on another side.
Therefore looking the figure 2.1 there is no work that meets all of the important charac-
teristics identified by the columns and this comparison helps to make the contribution of
the thesis more robust and useful demonstrating its novelty in the field of dependability
research for WSN.
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2.6 Discussion
All the analyzed work presented interesting methods and/or techniques which give a con-
tribution for the dependability assessment in WSN. These methods have been grouped in
four categories: experimental, simulative, analytical and formal.
Experimental methods are used to evaluate a real system and therefore they need for a
existent prototype; they are useful at runtime since through these methods do experiments
directly on the real system from which they collect data. Simulative and analytical may
be adopted in the design phase: they model a system and make an estimate of reliability
before of the system release. Finally formal methods make use of correctness specifications
and they can be used at runtime too by means of runtime verification techniques.
In table 2.2 a classification of the presented approaches is shown.
Table 2.2: Approach Classification
Approach Verification
Static Dynamic
Experimental × X
Simulative X ×
Analytical X ×
Formal X X
Currently there are proposals in the literature documenting the application of formal meth-
ods to model the WSN but they only focus on some dependability metric like lifetime and
power consumption; it is necessary to provide a method of assessing the dependability not
only in terms of lifetime and power consumption but also in terms of other important key
dependability metrics, such as coverage, connection resiliency to undesired events and data
delivery resiliency.
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Moreover, formal methods appear to be an attractive solution for the verification of de-
pendability both at design time that at runtime by defining one specification for the system
suitable for both purposes; the lack of a formal approach that can be applied for doing
static and dynamic verification in WSN remains an open issue.
The contribution of this dissertation wants to go beyond. Indeed it is proposed an auto-
matic process, supported by a user friendly tool, for adapting the specifications to the target
WSN and for computing dependability metrics automatically, starting from the analysis of
the reasoning output, during the design and when the WSN operates in a real scenario;
the proposed approach can help to bridge the gap between system engineers and formal
methods experts. The proposed automated dependability verification, using Event Calcu-
lus, calculates the mentioned dependability metrics giving information or warning messages
to the user.
2.7 Workflow towards a Methodology for Dependable WSN-
based Applications
In this paragraph we present and discuss the guidelines to define specifications for WSN-
based applications using Event Calculus. The workflow illustrated in figure 2.2 shows the
steps that we followed to realize verifiable specifications. This workflow is characterized
by four sequential blocks: Informal Modeling, General Correctness Specification Modeling,
Structural Correctness Modeling and Verification/Testing ; all the workflow consists of 13
tasks.
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2.7.1 Informal Modeling
In the Informal Modeling block the application domain and correctness properties are an-
alyzed.
Task 1.1: Informal Analysis of domain
Using natural language the application domain is described in a textual form useful to
understand what are the events, the fluents, the parameters (number of sensors, number of
packets, etc.).
Informal 
Modeling 
General Correctness 
Specification Modeling 
Structural Correctness 
Specification Modeling 
Verification/Testing 
Task 2.1:  
2.1.1 Identify failures 
Task 2.3:  
2.3.1 Identify events 
Task 2.5:  
2.5.1 Identify fluents 
Task 2.2:  
2.2.1 Define failures 
2.2.2. Define correctness 
properties 
2.2.3 Verify/test 
Task 2.4: 
2.4.1 Define events 
2.4.2 Define properties 
2.4.3 Verify/test  
Task 2.6:  
2.6.1 Define fluents 
2.6.2 Define properties 
2.6.3 Verify/test  
 
Task 3.1: 
3.1.1 Identify WSN topology 
Task 3.3: 
3.3.1 Identify WSN parameters 
Task 3.4:  
3.4.1 Define number of sensor 
3.4.2 Define number of packets 
3.4.3 Define number of timepoints 
Task 3.5: 
3.5.1 Define Event Trace 
Task 1.1:  
1.1.1 Informal Analysis  of 
domain  
Task 1.2:  
1.2.1 Informal Analysis  of   
correctness properties 
Task 4.1: 
4.1.1 Verify/test 
Corrections 
Corrections 
Iteractions 
Task 3.2: 
3.2.1 Define neighbor 
relationship between 
nodes 
Figure 2.2: The workflow for designing specifications for WSN-based applications (4 blocks
- 14 tasks).
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Task 1.2: Informal Analysis of correctness properties
After having defined the application domain, in this task the correctness properties to verify
are described, for example “A sensor is completely isolated if there is no path between this
node and the sink node”, “If a packet is not delivered to the sink node due to some failure
(node crash or disconnection between a couple of sensors), the packet is lost”, “If a node is
discharged, it stops its operation”.
2.7.2 General Correctness Specification Modeling
This block includes the identification of the correctness properties to detect which are valid
for every WSN. In particular failures, events and fluents are identified, defined and refined
after a verification and testing subprocess.
Task 2.1: Identify failures
This task identifies the failures that can occur in a WSN (e.g. isolation event, packet lost
event, battery exhaustion event). To perform this task we are based on results of FMEA
[34, 35] discussed in the chapter 1.
Task 2.2: Define the failures, the correctness properties, and verify/test
In this task failures, that are identified in task 2.1, and related correctness properties are
defined by means of Event Calculus language. Finally, verification and testing are performed
in this task; this could help to catch some specification errors, requiring their modification,
and thus verifying again the specification.
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Task 2.3: Identify events
This task identifies the events that sensors can generate during their running. For example,
a sensor can stop, restart, it can send a packet towards the sink node.
Task 2.4: Define the events, the properties, and verify/test
Formally in this task the identified events are defined in Event Calculus language; all their
properties are defined (e.g. sink node cannot ever be switched off) and verification and
testing of these events are performed. Also in this task, if after verification there is some
error, the specification of events has to be reviewed and corrected.
Task 2.5: Identify fluents
This task identifies the fluents associated to the events. Their values are dependent on the
events. An example of fluent is IsAlive(n): if the fluent is true then it means that the sensor
n is alive (i.e. it is working) else it means that the sensor is not working.
Task 2.6: Define the fluents, the properties, and verify/test
Formally in this task the identified fluents are defined in Event Calculus language; defin-
ing their properties it is possible to establish the initial conditions of the WSN (e.g. at
timepoint 0 all the sensors are reachable and are started) and verification and testing of
these fluents are performed. Also in this task, if after verification there is some error, the
specification of fluents has to be reviewed and corrected.
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2.7.3 Structural Correctness Modeling
This block is mainly related to the topology of the WSN and completed by parameters
regarding the structure of the WSN (number of sensors, number of packets) and by the
chosen observation time (number of timepoints). Differently from the previous step, this
specification varies on the basis of the characteristics of the target WSN.
Task 3.1: Identify WSN topology
This task focuses on the structure of topology WSN. In particular the specific topology to
consider is identified.
Task 3.2: Define neighbor relationship between nodes
In this task, it is formally defined the WSN topology. To specify the topology, the predicate
Neighbor is used to indicate how nodes are linked in the topology.
Task 3.3: Identify WSN parameters
In the Structural Specifications modeling, it is necessary identify what are the main WSN
parameters to formally declare.
Task 3.4: Define number of sensors, number of packets, number of timepoints
In this task we have to declare the number of the sensors of the topology, the number of the
packets that every sensor can send and the number of timepoints to select the observation
time.
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Task 3.5: Define Even Trace
In this task, we can formally declare, by means of Happens predicates, any initial sequence
of events of interest for the designer, e.g., to test the defined specifications in the previous
steps.
2.7.4 Verification/Testing
The last block concludes the workflow. The aim is to formally verify or test the entire set
of specifications by means of a Event Calculus reasoner. If some error is detected at this
phase, possible corrections may be performed in some previous block.
Task 4.1: Verify/test
The aim of this task is to verify if the defined general correctness specifications and the
defined structural specifications are correct or have to be reviewed to reach the aim without
errors.
Many things difficult to design prove
easy to performance
Samuel Johnson
Chapter 3
Static Verification
Undesired events, such as node crash and packet loss, may undermine the dependability of a WSN.
Their effects need to be properly assessed from the early stages of the development process onwards
to minimize the chances of unexpected problems during use.
This chapter presents a methodology for the static verification of WSN based systems using the Event
Calculus formal language. In particular we show how the formal specification can be used to verify the
design of a WSN in terms of its dependability properties defining a set of correctness specifications
in order to control the behavior of a generic WSN, coupled with specific structural specifications
describing the target network topology to evaluate. We present two different types of analysis: what-
if analysis and robustness checking. Finally an application scenario concludes the chapter describing
this type of verification in practice.
3.1 Rationale of the static verification technique
Formal methods are widely adopted in the literature to verify the correctness of a system
specification at design time. However, their practical use for the verification of dependabil-
ity properties of WSNs has received little attention, due to the distance between system
engineers and formal methods experts and the need to re-adapt the formal specification to
different design choices. Even if some development teams would invest on the definition
of a detailed specification of WSN correctness properties, a design change (e.g., different
network topology, number of produced packets) could require to rethink the formal specifi-
cation, incurring in extra undesirable costs.
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To address the issues listed above, a methodology for performing formal dependability ver-
ification of WSN at design time is presented.
In particular in this chapter we are going to describe the formal specification of WSN
correctness as two logical sets:
1. general correctness specification - a set of correctness properties specifications,
valid independently of the particular WSN under study
2. structural specification - a set of specifications and parameters related to the prop-
erties of the target WSN, e.g., number of nodes, network topology, quality of the wire-
less channel (in terms of disconnection probability), and initial charge of batteries.
The general specification is defined once and used across different WSN designs. The struc-
tural specification, instead, has to be adapted when changing the target WSN.
As dependability metrics, we consider connection resiliency, coverage, data delivery re-
siliency and power consumption, introduced in chapter 1, that are the most important
dependability metrics for WSN. The proposed static verification technique is characterized
by two different types of analysis (starting from the same specification):
1. what-if analysis to verify how the WSN behaves in response to a given sequence of
events of interest for the designer,
2. robustness checking to verify the long term robustness of the WSN against ran-
dom sequences of undesired events, useful to identify corner cases and dependability
bottlenecks.
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3.2 General Correctness Specification
The proposed verification framework is founded on the definition of a core formal specifi-
cation in Event Calculus. The main idea is to formalize the correctness properties allowing
engineers to verify if a given WSN design, specified in terms of number of nodes, position of
nodes, channel quality, and initial battery level, is able to satisfy given design constraints.
The metrics, defined in chapter 1, are evaluated by analyzing the narrative generated by
the reasoner based on the specification of the target WSN.
Following the workflow for designing specifications for WSN-based applications, discussed
in section 2.7, in this phase we are performing the second step (figure 3.1).
Informal 
Modeling 
General Correctness 
Specification Modeling 
Structural Correctness 
Specification Modeling 
Verification/Testing 
Task 2.1:  
2.1.1 Identify failures 
Task 2.3:  
2.3.1 Identify events 
Task 2.5:  
2.5.1 Identify fluents 
Task 2.2:  
2.2.1 Define failures 
2.2.2. Define correctness 
properties 
2.2.3 Verify/test 
Task 2.4: 
2.4.1 Define events 
2.4.2 Define properties 
2.4.3 Verify/test  
Task 2.6:  
2.6.1 Define fluents 
2.6.2 Define properties 
2.6.3 Verify/test  
 
Task 3.1: 
3.1.1 Identify WSN topology 
Task 3.3: 
3.3.1 Identify WSN parameters 
Task 3.4:  
3.4.1 Define number of sensor 
3.4.2 Define number of packets 
3.4.3 Define number of timepoints 
Task 3.5: 
3.5.1 Define Event Trace 
Task 1.1:  
1.1.1 Informal Analysis  of 
domain  
Task 1.2:  
1.2.1 Informal Analysis  of   
correctness properties 
Task 4.1: 
4.1.1 Verify/test 
Corrections 
Corrections 
Iteractions 
Task 3.2: 
3.2.1 Define neighbor 
relationship between 
nodes 
Figure 3.1: Workflow for designing specifications for WSN-based applications: General
Correctness Specification Modeling
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The general correctness specification is described in the following. It specifies that a WSN
performs correctly if none of the following undesired events (or failures) happen:
1. isolation event, i.e., a node is no more able to reach the sink;
2. packet loss event, i.e., a packet is lost during the traversal of the network;
3. battery exhaustion event, i.e., a node stops to work since it has run out of battery.
The first two kind of events can be caused by more “basic events”, such as the stop of one
or more nodes (e.g., due to crash or battery exhaustion) or the temporary disconnection of
a node to its neighbor(s) due to transmission errors. The last kind of event is generated by
considering the initial battery charge and the energy request of nodes due to packet sending
and receiving activities (in general assumed to be power demanding activities with respect
to CPU activities [118]).
We concentrate on the three main events described previously considering the results of a
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis conducted on WSNs in [36, 35, 34] and described in chap-
ter 1. Moreover the approach allows to extend the specification with other events, if needed.
3.2.1 Isolation event
The isolation event happens when a node is no more able to reach the sink of the WSN,
i.e., the gateway node where data are stored or processed. The isolation might be caused
by more simple, basic events, such as a stop of a node, due to an arbitrary crash or battery
exhaustion, and the disconnection of a node from another node.
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For instance, let us consider the figure 3.2 and let us suppose that node i is the only one
allowing the transmission of data between the sink node and the subnet A. We want to
check when the subnet A is isolated from the rest of network. We suppose that node i is
connected with node j and k. If node i fails, the nodes j and k (and the all the nodes of
the subnet A) are alive but isolated and so the whole subnet A is isolated.
More in general, if a subnet depends by a node and this node becomes isolated then all of
the nodes of the subnet are isolated.
Figure 3.2: Isolation of a WSN subnet
In table 3.1 we report the basic elements (sorts, events and fluents) used for the specification.
We distinguish basic events from generated events. These last events are generated by
the reasoner on the basis of the specification and of the sequence of basic events actually
occurred.
Listing 3.1 shows the rules that represent the core of the specification for an isolation
event. In lines 1-7 we define a rule to verify when a node becomes isolated. A sensor can
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Table 3.1: Basic elements of the specification for the isolation event
Elements Name Description
Sorts sensor reference sensor for events and
fluents
to sensor sensor used in case of connection
(i.e. a sensor connects to an-
other sensor)
from sensor sensor used in case of disconnec-
tion (i.e. a sensor disconnects
from another sensor)
Basic
Events
Start(sensor) it occurs when a sensor turns on
Stop(sensor) it occurs when a sensor turns off
Connect(sensor, to sensor) it occurs when a sensor connects
to another sensor
Disconnect(sensor, from sensor) it occurs when a sensor discon-
nects from another sensor
Generated
Events
Isolate(sensor) it occurs when a sensor is iso-
lated from the network
Join(sensor) it occurs when there is at least a
connection between a sensor and
one or more sensors
Fluents IsAlive(sensor) true when a Start event occurs
for a sensor
IsLinked(sensor, to sensor) true when a Connect event oc-
curs
IsReachable(sensor) true when a sensor is reachable
from the sink node
be isolated if it is initially reachable (HoldsAt(IsReachable (sensor),time)), alive (HoldsAt(
IsAlive(sensor),time)) and, considering a link with another sensor (Neighbor (from_sensor
, sensor)), there is no sensor that is alive, reachable and connected with the sensor (!{from
_sensor2} (HoldsAt(IsAlive(from_sensor2),time)& HoldsAt(IsReachable (from_sensor2),
time)& HoldsAt(IsLinked( sensor , from sensor2 ) , time)) & Neighbor (from_sensor2,
sensor)).
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Listing 3.1: Correctness Specification for the Isolation event
1 [sensor,from_sensor, time] Neighbor(from_sensor,sensor) & HoldsAt(
2 IsReachable(sensor),time) & HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time) &
3 (!{from_sensor2} (HoldsAt(IsAlive(from_sensor2),time) &
4 HoldsAt(IsReachable(from_sensor2),time) & HoldsAt(
5 IsLinked(sensor,from_sensor2),time)) &
6 Neighbor(from_sensor2,sensor)) ->
7 Happens(Isolate(sensor),time).
8
9 [sensor,from_sensor, time] ( !HoldsAt(IsReachable(sensor),time) &
10 HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time) & HoldsAt(IsAlive(
11 from_sensor),time) & HoldsAt(IsReachable(from_sensor),time))
12 & HoldsAt(IsLinked(sensor,from_sensor),time) &
13 Neighbor(from_sensor,sensor) ->
14 Happens(Join(sensor),time).
15
16 [sensor,from_sensor, time] ((HoldsAt(IsAlive(from_sensor),time) &
17 HoldsAt(IsReachable(from_sensor),time) & HoldsAt(
18 IsLinked(sensor,from_sensor),time)) | !HoldsAt(
19 IsReachable(sensor),time) | !HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time))
20 & Neighbor(from_sensor,sensor) ->
21 !Happens(Isolate(sensor),time).
22
23 [sensor,from_sensor,time] ( HoldsAt(IsReachable(sensor),time) |
24 !HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time) | !HoldsAt(
25 IsLinked(sensor,from_sensor),time) |
26 !HoldsAt(IsAlive(from_sensor),time) | !HoldsAt(
27 IsReachable(from_sensor),time)) & Neighbor(from_sensor,sensor)->
28 !Happens(Join(sensor),time). 
Also we report (in lines 9-14) another rule which allows to check a Join event. In
particular the rule declares that if a sensor is not reachable, because is isolated, (!HoldsAt
(IsReachable(sensor),time)) and alive (HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time)) and its neighbor
sensor is also alive and reachable (HoldsAt(IsReachable(from_sensor),time))& HoldsAt(
IsLinked(sensor , from_sensor ) , time ) ) and there is a connection between
them (HoldsAt(IsLinked(sensor,from_sensor),time)) then the sensor can join the network
(Happens(Join(sensor),time)) and becomes reachable again.
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3.2.2 Packet Loss event
When there is a failure in a node or a link between a couple of nodes is disrupted then all
of the packets that are in delivery towards this node are lost. In turn, these packets are not
delivered to the sink.
For instance, let us consider figure 3.3. Node A sends a packet pkt to node B. If node B
crashes it cannot receive the packet from node A and forward it to a node towards the sink;
so the packet is lost.
Figure 3.3: Example of packet loss
In table 3.2 we report the basic elements (sort, events and fluents) used for the specification
related to the packet loss event. Again, events are divided in basic and generated ones. In
the listing 3.2 there are the rules that represent the core of the specification for the packet
loss event.
Listing 3.2: Correctness Specifications for the packet loss event
1 [pkt,sensor,to_sensor,time]Happens(Send(pkt,sensor),time) &
2 Neighbor(to_sensor, sensor) ->
3 Happens(Forward(pkt,sensor,sensor,to_sensor),time).
4
5 [sensor,from_sensor,source,pkt,time]
6 HoldsAt(IsOnChannel(pkt,source,from_sensor, sensor),time) &
7 (!{sensor2,from_sensor2,source2,pkt2} HoldsAt(
8 IsOnChannel(pkt2,source2,from_sensor2, sensor2),time) &
9 source!=source2 & sensor=sensor2) & HoldsAt(
10 IsAlive(sensor),time) & HoldsAt(IsLinked(from_sensor,
11 sensor),time) & !HoldsAt(IsLost(pkt,source),time) ->
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12 Happens(Catch(pkt,source,sensor, from_sensor),time).
13
14 [sensor,from_sensor,pkt,from_sensor2, pkt2,source, source2, time]
15 HoldsAt(IsOnChannel(pkt,source,from_sensor, sensor),time) &
16 HoldsAt(IsOnChannel(pkt2,source2,from_sensor2, sensor),time) &
17 source<source2 & HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time) & HoldsAt(
18 IsLinked(from_sensor,sensor),time) & !HoldsAt(
19 IsLost(pkt,source),time)->
20 Happens(Catch(pkt,source,sensor, from_sensor),time).
21
22 [sensor,to_sensor,from_sensor,source,pkt,time]
23 Happens(Catch(pkt,source,sensor, from_sensor),time) &
24 Neighbor(sensor, from_sensor) & Neighbor(to_sensor, sensor) &
25 HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time) & !HoldsAt(IsLost(pkt,source),time) ->
26 Happens(Forward(pkt,source,sensor,to_sensor),time+1).
27
28 [from_sensor,source,pkt,time]Happens(Catch(pkt,source,1, from_sensor),time) ->
29 Happens(Receive(pkt,source),time).
30
31 [sensor,to_sensor,source,pkt,time]HoldsAt(IsInDelivery(pkt,source),time) &
32 !HoldsAt(IsLost(pkt,source),time) & HoldsAt(
33 IsOnChannel(pkt,source,sensor, to_sensor),time) & Neighbor(
34 to_sensor, sensor) & (!HoldsAt(IsLinked(sensor,to_sensor),time) |
35 Happens(Stop(to_sensor),time) | !HoldsAt(IsAlive(to_sensor),time) ) ->
36 Happens(PacketLoss(pkt,source),time). 
By means of the rule defined in lines 1-3, we assert that when a Send event comes from the
WSN (Happens(Send(pkt,sensor),time)), a Forward event is generated (Happens(Forward(
pkt,sensor,sensor,to_sensor),time)) and the packet delivery starts.
In the lines 5-12, we define the Catch event (Happens(Catch(pkt,source,sensor, from_
sensor),time)) that occurs when, being the packet on the channel between a couple of
nodes (HoldsAt(IsOnChannel(pkt,source,from_sensor, sensor),time)), the receiving sen-
sor is alive (HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time)), the packet is not lost (!HoldsAt(IsLost(pkt,
source),time)) and there is a connection between the nodes (HoldsAt(IsLinked(from_sensor
,sensor),time)). Note that we also included a concurrency control in order to manage
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Table 3.2: Basic elements of the specification for the packet loss event
Elements Name Description
Sorts pkt it is the packet id
source it is the sensor that
sends the packet
Basic
Events
Send(pkt,source) it occurs when a sen-
sor starts the delivery
of a packet (pkt) to-
ward the sink node
Generated
Events
Receive(pkt, source) it occurs when sink
node receives a packet
Catch(pkt,source, sensor, from sensor) it occurs when a sensor
catches a packet from
one of its neighbor sen-
sors
Forward(pkt,source, sensor, to sensor) it occurs when a sen-
sor, once caught a
packet sent by a sen-
sor, forwards it to its
neighbor sensor
PacketLoss(pkt, source) it occurs when a packet
is lost
Fluents IsInDelivery(pkt, source) true when a packet de-
livery starts
IsOnChannel(pkt,source, sensor, to sensor) true when a packet is
in transmission on the
channel between two
nodes
IsLost(pkt, source) true when a packet is
lost
packets that come from different nodes (!{sensor2,from_sensor2,source2,pkt2}HoldsAt(
IsOnChannel(pkt2,source2,from_sensor2,sensor2),time)& source!=source2 & sensor=sensor
2).
Also, we can check the end of the packet delivery (lines 28-29) when it is caught (Happens
(Catch(pkt,source,1, from_sensor),time)) by the sink node (node 1) and so it is received
(Happens(Receive(pkt,source),time)).
Finally, in lines 31-36 we report the rule that checks when a packet is lost.
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Considering a packet, that is not lost (!HoldsAt(IsLost(pkt,source),time)) and is in deliv-
ery toward the sink node (HoldsAt(IsInDelivery(pkt,source),time)) and is on the channel
between two nodes (HoldsAt(IsOnChannel(pkt,source,sensor, to_sensor),time)), when a
disconnection event between the two nodes (!HoldsAt(IsLinked(sensor,to_sensor),time))
or the failure of receiving node occurs (Happens(Stop(to_sensor),time)|!HoldsAt(IsAlive(
to_sensor),time)) then there is a packet loss event (Happens(PacketLoss(pkt,source),time
)).
3.2.3 Battery Exhaustion event
A battery exhaustion event happens when a node completely consume its available energy.
To this aim, we adopt a sort in the specification for each sensor node, called level, which
represents the level of the battery of the node, and that is decremented each time the node
sends, catches, or forwards a packet.
In table 3.3 we report the basic elements (sort, events and fluents) used for the specification
related to the battery exhaustion event. For this specification, the basic events are the same
shown for the previous specifications. Hence, we only report generated events.
In the listing 3.3 there are the rules that represent the core of the specification for the
battery exhaustion event.
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When a forward event occurs (due to a sending of a packet) (Happens(Forward(pkt, source,
sensor,to_sensor),time)) and the battery level of the sensor is positive (HoldsAt(BatteryLevel
(level,sensor),time)& level>0) then we consider the new consume level (lines 1-3), (Happens
(Old_Consume(level,sensor),time)& ({levelnew}levelnew=level-1 & Happens (
New_Consume (levelnew ,sensor),time))).
In the lines 5-7 we can see that when the battery level of a sensor, that is alive (HoldsAt(
IsAlive(sensor),time)), is zero (HoldsAt(BatteryLevel(0,sensor),time)) then a failure for
the node occurs due to battery exhaustion (Happens(Stop(sensor),time)).
Table 3.3: Basic elements of the specification for the battery exhaustion event
Elements Name Description
Sorts level the current battery level of a sensor
levelnew the new battery level of a sensor after
RX/TX operations related to a packet
capacity indicates the maximum battery capac-
ity of a sensor, in terms of the maximum
number of packets that it can send
Basic
Events
- -
Generated
Events
New Consume(level,sensor) it occurs when the battery level of a sen-
sor decreases after the forwarding of a
packet
Old Consume(level,sensor) event created for specification reasons
Fluents BatteryLevel(level,sensor) true when the battery charge of a sensor
is equal to a certain level
Listing 3.3: Correctness Specification for the battery exhaustion event
1 [pkt,sensor,to_sensor,source,level,time]
2 Happens(Forward(pkt, source, sensor,to_sensor),time) & HoldsAt(BatteryLevel(level,
sensor),time) & level>0->
3 Happens(Old_Consume(level,sensor),time) & ({levelnew}levelnew=level-1 & Happens(
New_Consume(levelnew,sensor),time)).
4
5 [sensor,time]
6 HoldsAt(BatteryLevel(0,sensor),time) & HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),time) ->
7 Happens(Stop(sensor),time). 
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3.3 Structural Specification
General correctness specifications are complemented by a structural specification of the tar-
get WSN. This is mainly related to the topology of the WSN and completed by parameters
regarding the initial level of batteries and the quality of channels. Differently from the
specifications described in the previous sub-section, this specification varies on the basis of
the characteristics of the target WSN.
Following the workflow for designing specifications for WSN-based applications in this phase
we are performing the third step (figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Workflow for designing specifications for WSN-based applications: Structural
Correctness Specification Modeling
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To specify the topology, we use the predicate Neighbor (already used in the previous spec-
ifications) to indicate how nodes are linked in the topology. For instance, considering the
topology in figure 3.5, let us suppose node i is connected with j and k and let us consider
a tree graph where the sink node (root node) is the node i and the nodes j and k are child
nodes.
Figure 3.5: Example of topology of a WSN
The resulting specification is reported in listing 3.4, where sensor1 is the parent node (i)
and sensor2 are the child nodes (j and k). Clearly, this specification can be changed easily
if the topology of the WSN changes.
Listing 3.4: Example of Neighbor predicate Specification
1 [sensor1,sensor2] Neighbor(sensor1,sensor2) <-> (
2 (sensor1=i & sensor2=j) |
3 (sensor1=i & sensor2=k)
4 ). 
The role of the Neighbor predicate is very important to understand when an axiom can be
applied. Let us examine the axiom related at a possible isolation (lines 1-7 of listing 3.1)
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and let us apply it for the figure 3.5. The described implication is true when, given a couple
of nodes (sensor, from sensor), the conditions about isolation are true and there is a link
between nodes (in this case, between node j and i or between node k and i). This, for
instance, can never be true for the couple of nodes j and k, since there is not a physical link
between them.
Regarding the parameters, their values can be used to check the correctness properties of
the WSN under different conditions, i.e., under different assumptions on the initial charge
of batteries (e.g., to verify a WSN in the middle of its life), or under different environmen-
tal conditions affecting the quality of the channels (impacting on the probability to have a
disconnection event when checking the robustness of the WSN).
3.4 Types of Analysis
To provide useful support for static verification we introduce two different types of analysis:
what-if analysis, to verify how the WSN behaves in response to a given sequence of events
of interest for the designer, and robustness checking, to verify the long term robustness of
the WSN against random sequences of undesired events, useful to identify corner cases and
dependability bottlenecks.
3.4.1 What-if Analysis
The goal of a what-if scenario analysis is to verify the behavior of the target WSN under
precise circumstances. To this aim, we need to indicate an initial event sequence (Event
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Trace). For example, as listing 3.5 shows, by means of Happens predicates, we can declare
that at timepoint 1 sensor j stops, at timepoint 3 sensor k stops, etc. In this way, by means
of the reasoner, we can observe the consequences of any initial sequence of events of interest
for the designer, e.g., to test the robustness of the designed topology against the temporary
unavailability (failure/recovery) of a given set of nodes, or to quantify to what extent a
modification of the topology can be beneficial for the network.
Listing 3.5: Example of initial event trace
1 Happens(Stop(j),1).
2 Happens(Stop(k),3).
3 Happens(Start(k),4).
4 Happens(Disconnect(k,i),5).
5
6 completion Happens 
3.4.2 Robustness Checking
For Robustness Checking we intend a technique to statically verify the behavior of a WSN
in front of a number of failures that can occur during its operation.
We distinguish two types of robustness checking analysis. The first one aims to analyze
the robustness of the network, in terms of coverage, against a variable number of failures
(stop and disconnection events), from 1 to n, where n is selected by the user, considering
all combinations without repetitions. It is particularly useful to evaluate the coverage and
connection resiliency of the network and pinpoint weak points in the topology. The second
one aims to analyze how the target WSN behaves during a periodic sending of packets if
random failures happen, causing packets to be lost. It is useful to evaluate the data delivery
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resiliency of the network. These two types of robustness checking analysis are detailed in
the following.
Coverage Robustness Checking
This test is aimed to verify how many node failures the network can tolerate, while guaran-
teeing a given minimum level of coverage. For example if we consider a network composed
by m nodes and a threshold coverage equal to 50%, we may want to understand what are
the sequences of failures causing more than m/2 nodes to be isolated (i.e., coverage under
the specified threshold) and how the resiliency level varies when varying the sequences of
failures. This allows to evaluate the maximum (and minimum) resiliency level reachable by
a given topology and what are the critical failure sequences, i.e., the shortest ones causing
a loss of coverage. These are particularly useful to pinpoint weak points in the network.
We developed an algorithm to generate automatically the sequences of failures (stop and
disconnection events) against which checking the robustness of the WSN. The algorithm is
aimed to reduce the number of failure sequences to be checked. The principles are to avoid
repetitions and to end the sequence as soon as the coverage level becomes lower than the
user defined threshold. For instance, we start considering all the cases when there is one
failure. By means of the DECReasoner we compute the coverage; if the coverage is above
the threshold, the resiliency is surely greater than 1, because there is just one failure and it
is tolerated in all cases. In the generic k− th step, we consider sequences of k failures. If the
generic sequence {f1, f2, ..., fk} leads to a coverage below the threshold, we do not consider
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sequences starting with a {f1, f2, ..., fk} prefix in the (k + 1)− th step. By considering the
percentage of sequences with k failures where the coverage is above the threshold, let us
say gk%, we can say that the resiliency is k in gk% of cases.
The described process is summarized by means of the algorithm for the computation of
event sequences with n failures shown in listing 3.6.
Listing 3.6: Algorithm for the computation of event sequences with n failures
1 int f=1;
2 while (f<=failures)
3 {
4 {if f==1
5 {
6 Computation of all combinations with 1 failure
7 gen_traces()
8 Storing these traces in a combination file
9 create_and_reason() //Create and make reasoning on these traces
10 new_traces = compute_resiliency() // Resiliency computation
11 Percentage of resiliency: number of traces with coverage upper the threshold (
dim) / all of the events (total number of single failures)
12 per_resiliency = (dim*100) / events_map.size();
13 }
14 2 or more failures
15 else {
16 for (int ev =0; ev<new_traces.size(); ev++)
17 {
18 gen_traces()
19 Create and make reasoning on these traces
20 create_and_reason(traces_pp,f_count,events_map, coverage,con_resiliency);
21 Resiliency computation: if the experiment with the ’ev’-th trace produces
coverage false, it is deleted otherwise this trace will stay in ’traces_
prov’ (provvisory)
22 traces_prov=calcola_resiliency(traces_pp, events_map,f_count,output_r);
23 Insert the traces, contained in ’traces_prov’ and related to this \textbf{for
} cycle, in a global file; in this last file there are all the traces to
consider for the experiments with upper number of failures.
24 for (int traces_prov_ind =0; traces_prov_ind<traces_prov.size(); traces_prov_ind
++)
25 {
26 traces_all.addElement(traces_prov.elementAt(traces_prov_ind));
27 }
28
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29 Calculate total number of combinations.
30 * Ex.: if number of failures is 2 and the number of possible failures is 12, we
have 12!/(12-2)! = 12*11 = 132
31 den = fatt(events_map.size()) / fatt(events_map.size()-f_count);
32 Percentage of resiliency: number of traces with coverage upper the threshold (
dim) / all of the combinations (den)
33 per_resiliency = dim * 100 / den;
34 new_traces = traces_all;
35 }
36 f_count++; // counter of the while cycle
37 }
38 } 
Data Delivery Robustness Checking
In this case we want to check the robustness of the WSN in case of failures when there are
packets being delivery on the network.
To do this, we model each link of the WSN on the basis of the Gilbert-Elliott Channel Model
[59], and we associate to each link a disconnection probability (indicating the channel qual-
ity), set as a parameter by the user together with the structural specification. This way, the
user can simulate different scenarios, e.g., environments with different channel conditions.
We simulate that, assuming a periodic WSN, every sensor sends periodically a packet to
the sink. At the same time we randomly generate failures (failures node and/or disconnec-
tion events), taking into account disconnection probabilities. The data delivery resiliency is
computed as the maximum number of failures that can be sustained while a given fraction
of packets (above a given threshold) is still received at the sink.
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3.5 Application Scenario
In this paragraph we want to show the static verification technique by means of an appli-
cation scenario; the aim is to describe how it is possible to detect failures and observe their
effects in a WSN with Event Calculus.
By means of the application scenario we are going to verify the defined sets of specifications.
In fact, following the workflow for designing specifications for WSN-based applications in
this phase we are performing the fourth and last step (figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.6: Workflow for designing specifications for WSN-based applications: Verifica-
tion/Testing
Let us consider the figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: WSN topology of application scenario
The network reported in figure is composed by 9 nodes disposed on the basis of a defined
topology.
We want to observe the behavior of this WSN in 10 timepoints, supposing that, after two
timepoints, node 6 stops, a disconnection between node 7 and node 4 occurs at timepoint
4 and that node 2 stops at timepoint 7. In particular, we are interested to evaluate if the
reasoning performed by the DECReasoner on our specifications is correct.
For a coverage threshold set at 60%, we should observe a coverage interval equals to [0;4]
(i.e., when node 7 disconnects from node 4 at timepoint 4, four nodes are not reachable,
namely 6, 7, 8 and 9), and a connection resiliency equals to 1 (i.e., only the first stop event
is tolerated).
In the following, we show the structural specification written in Event Calculus language
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and created for this application scenario, and the trace produced by the DECReasoner by
providing the WSN connectivity matrix and the initial event trace chosen for this example.
3.5.1 Structural Specification generated by Event Calculus
Previously, we have discussed about the application scenario we want to observe give an
occurring particular sequence of events.
Now, we want to discuss about the structural specification file (listing 3.7) in which, by
means of Event Calculus syntax, the files used by DECReasoner are loaded, it is formally
defined the WSN topology, the event trace to consider and all the parameters that charac-
terized the network and the study are defined. For instance, we define the links between
the nodes considering the chosen topology, the events that we have supposed occur during
the observation time and the number of the sensors and of the timepoints.
File loading
In the first part (lines 1-2) we have to load the main Event Calculus files (Root.e and EC.e).
Root.e file defines the boolean, integer, predicate and function sorts; EC.e defines the sorts,
functions, predicates and axioms for the Event Calculus.
For our aim, we have to load the IsolationWorld.e file, too (line 4). In this manner, the
axioms defined to detect isolation events are interpreted for the topology described in this
application scenario.
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Listing 3.7: Structural specification written in Event Calculus language for WSN-based
application scenario
1 load foundations/Root.e
2 load foundations/EC.e
3
4 load /home/alessandro-64/IsolationWorld.e
5
6 [sensor1,sensor2] Neighbor(sensor1,sensor2) <-> (
7 (sensor1=1 & sensor2=2) | (sensor1=1 & sensor2=3) | (sensor1=1 & sensor2=4) |
8 (sensor1=2 & sensor2=5) |
9 (sensor1=3 & sensor2=6) |
10 (sensor1=4 & sensor2=7) |
11 (sensor1=6 & sensor2=8) | (sensor1=6 & sensor2=9)
12 ).
13
14
15
16 [sensor] HoldsAt(IsAlive(sensor),0).
17 [sensor,from_sensor] Neighbor(from_sensor, sensor) <-> HoldsAt(IsLinked(sensor,
from_sensor),0).
18
19 Happens(Stop(6),2).
20 Happens(Disconnect(7 , 4),4).
21 Happens(Stop(2),7).
22
23
24
25 completion Happens
26
27 range from_sensor 1 9
28 range sensor 1 9
29 range to_sensor 1 9
30 range time 0 10
31 range offset 1 1
32 option n_models 1
33 option modeldiff on 
Formal definition of topology
Analyzing the WSN topology, we establish (lines 6-12) how the nodes are linked by means
of a predicate symbol Neighbor.
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Initial conditions
In the lines 16-17 we set some initial conditions. The reasoner considers these conditions
when it starts the reasoning.
Every sensor is alive, is reachable and is linked with another sensor on the basis of the WSN
topology.
Event Trace
In the application scenario, we insert an event trace (lines 19-21) that is composed by a list
of Happens predicates that specify nodes and timepoints in which a given event occurs.
The completion statement specifies that a predicate symbol (i.e. Happens) should be sub-
ject to predicate completion.
Parameters
Finally, in the last part we consider ranges of values for sensors and timepoints.
In this case we know that the network is composed by 9 nodes and we want to observe what
it could happen in 10 timepoints.
3.5.2 Outcome and Metrics computation
Listing 3.8 reports the outcome produced by the DECReasoner.
The event trace confirms our expectations. We can observe that at timepoint 2 node 6 stops
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(line 50), due to a failure, and it is not alive anymore isolating nodes 8 and 9 (lines 53-54).
Thus these two nodes become not reachable (lines 56-57). Considering that, because of a
disconnection from node 4 (line 58) at timepoint 4, node 7 is isolated (line 61) becoming
not reachable (line 63), then this means that at timepoint 5 a total of 4 nodes are isolated.
The coverage is computed as the time point of the last failure event causing such isolation,
that is 4. Consequently, the connection resiliency is computed by counting the number of
failures and disconnection events in the interval [0; 4], excluding the last event; hence, it
is equal to 1. At the last, the failure of the node 2 at timepoint 7 (line 65) (and thus the
isolation of node 5 (lines 69-70)) do not alter the results.
The dependability metrics can be valuated by analyzing the event flow (the narrative) gen-
erated by the DECReasoner based on the specification of the target WSN.
In the lines 22-47 the outcome shows the conditions of the WSN at timepoint 0: all of the
nodes are alive, are reachable and every node is linked with its neighbor on the basis of the
considered topology.
Listing 3.8: Outcome produced by the DECReasoner for WSN-based application scenario
1 #
2 # Copyright (c) 2005 IBM Corporation and others.
3 # All rights reserved. This program and the accompanying materials
4 # are made available under the terms of the Common Public License v1.0
5 # which accompanies this distribution, and is available at
6 # http://www.eclipse.org/legal/cpl-v10.html
7 #
8 # Contributors:
9 # IBM - Initial implementation
10 #
11
12 loading /home/alessandro-64/Dottorato/EventCalculus/EC_Application/topology1803EC
_20130318174304.e
13 loading foundations/Root.e
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14 loading foundations/EC.e
15 loading /home/alessandro-64/IsolationWorld.e
16 15329 variables and 129112 clauses
17 relsat solver
18 1 model
19 ---
20 model 1:
21 0
22 IsAlive(1).
23 IsAlive(2).
24 IsAlive(3).
25 IsAlive(4).
26 IsAlive(5).
27 IsAlive(6).
28 IsAlive(7).
29 IsAlive(8).
30 IsAlive(9).
31 IsLinked(2, 1).
32 IsLinked(3, 1).
33 IsLinked(4, 1).
34 IsLinked(5, 2).
35 IsLinked(6, 3).
36 IsLinked(7, 4).
37 IsLinked(8, 6).
38 IsLinked(9, 6).
39 IsReachable(1).
40 IsReachable(2).
41 IsReachable(3).
42 IsReachable(4).
43 IsReachable(5).
44 IsReachable(6).
45 IsReachable(7).
46 IsReachable(8).
47 IsReachable(9).
48 1
49 2
50 Happens(Stop(6), 2).
51 3
52 -IsAlive(6).
53 Happens(Isolate(8), 3).
54 Happens(Isolate(9), 3).
55 4
56 -IsReachable(8).
57 -IsReachable(9).
58 Happens(Disconnect(7, 4), 4).
59 5
60 -IsLinked(7, 4).
61 Happens(Isolate(7), 5).
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62 6
63 -IsReachable(7).
64 7
65 Happens(Stop(2), 7).
66 8
67 -IsAlive(2).
68 Happens(Isolate(5), 8).
69 9
70 -IsReachable(5).
71 10
72 P 
To simplify the adoption of the specification and thus the performing of an experiment con-
sidering a WSN with its topology and a particular event trace, in the chapter 5 we are going
to present a support tool designed to automatically generate the structural specifications,
given the target WSN topology, perform reasoning, by means of the DECReasoner, starting
from the correctness and structural specifications and from an initial event trace (i.e., to
perform the What-if analysis of a WSN), and finally compute dependability metrics, such
as connection resiliency, coverage, data delivery resiliency and power consumption, starting
from the outcome produced by the reasoner.
Make your own recovery the first
priority in your life.
Robin Norwood
Chapter 4
Dynamic Verification
To evaluate the WSN dependability at design time is necessary in order to increase the confidence
about the robustness of the designed solution before putting it into operation; but it is also necessary
to monitor the system during operation in order to avoid unexpected results or dangerous effects.
Runtime Verification is a good solution to perform this type of verification and despite in literature
there already are tools and languages (i.e. Reactive Event Calculus) that are able to perform runtime
verification, our aim is to demonstrate that we can perform both verification techniques (static and
runtime) exploiting the same sets of specifications (general and structural).
This chapter presents a rationale of the dynamic verification technique of WSN based systems. In
particular we present the Runtime Verification technique and propose the design of a reliable WSN-
based monitoring system based on dependable monitoring services and on the configurable and the
automatic deployment of system monitors. Finally an application scenario concludes the chapter
describing this type of verification in practice.
4.1 Rationale of the dynamic verification technique
Since WSNs are used in critical scenarios (Ambient Assisted Living, Home Monitoring,
Health Monitoring, ...), it is not sufficient to verify them only at design time but it is also
necessary at runtime since even if the system has been verified during its design, it needs
to be monitored during all his life to detect unexpected differences and avoid dangerous
effects. In other terms, it is needed to perform a continuous monitoring in order to check
the dependability behavior even when the WSN is operating.
In the Chapter 3 we have defined a set of general correctness specifications and a set of
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structural specifications dependent on a target WSN; after these definitions we have pre-
sented a static verification technique.
In this chapter we want to show that it is possible also to perform dynamic verification ex-
ploiting the same specifications defined for the static verification. The aim of the dynamic
verification is not only to detect the criticalities of the WSN in the current state but it also
is to perform a prediction of the possible future criticalities that may occur in the WSN.
To monitor a WSN-based system at runtime we can adopt the Runtime Verification (RV)
technique.
RV is a technique that is dedicated to studying, to developing and to implementing of so-
lutions that verify whether correctness properties defined for a system are met or violated.
In particular among the RV techniques there is one that is based on the Event Calculus
formalism: the Reactive Event Calculus (REC). Though REC could be a valid solution for
our aim, we chose to not consider it since it would have implied the using of a different
tool, and to re-adapt all the specifications for Prolog since the current REC tool is based
on Prolog.
Moreover, since the events, defined in the previous chapter (i.e. Start, Stop, Send, etc...)
are not simulated anymore but they have to be detected from the system, in this chapter
we also propose the design of a reliable WSN-based monitoring system based on depend-
able monitoring services and on the configurable and the automatic deployment of system
monitors with the task of catching events to consider to perform reasoning for the dynamic
verification. For example, if a node fails in a WSN while it is running, this failure event is
detected by a system monitor; by means of a reasoning, on the basis of the received event,
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dependability metrics are calculated both for the current status of the WSN and to assess
the criticality of the network, in order to alert the user about possible future hazardous
scenarios considering the new network conditions.
4.2 Runtime Verification
Runtime verification [121] is the discipline of computer science that deals with the study,
development, and application of verification techniques that allow checking whether a run
of a system under scrutiny satisfies or violates a given correctness property [87]. The field
of runtime verification arose from the desire to check the correctness of complex programs
without needing to check every possible execution of the software.
The goal of runtime verification [13] is to determine, at every time step, if the system is
currently meeting its correctness requirement (in our case, dependability attributes); a de-
scription of system correctness is a set of formally specified, high-level and time-evolved
behaviors that have been determined to be necessary for correct system operation. It can
be used to automatically evaluate test runs, either on-line, or off-line analyzing stored exe-
cution traces; or it can be employed on-line, during the operation of the system, potentially
steering the application back to a safety region if a property is violated.
In detail, runtime verification enables the checking of correctness properties with respect to
system implementations [48]. It concerns the application of a lightweight formal verification
during the execution of the system by checking traces of events generated from the system
run against the correctness properties. When a property is violated, a recovery strategy
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is triggered. The technique scales well since just one model of computation is considered,
rather than the entire state space like in model-checking [42].
Figure 4.1: Running System with support of the Runtime Checker
The Runtime verification may become a major verification technique especially for systems
in which the behavior depends heavily on the environment and operational conditions [33].
In other words, the behavior of highly dynamic systems such as adaptive, self-organizing,
self-healing, or pervasive systems, depends heavily on the environment and changes over
time, which makes their behavior hard to predict and analyze prior the execution. To
ensure certain correctness properties, the runtime verification can become part of the archi-
tecture of dynamic systems, independently from the specific architectural model adopted.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of use of a runtime checker: while the system is running, the
Runtime Checker checks if the system is currently meeting its correctness properties (the
specification).
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4.2.1 Reactive Event Calculus
The Reactive Event Calculus (REC) is a reactive version of the logic-based Event Calculus
language [28]. In the REC fluents are initiated and terminated by dynamically occurring
events.
A REC based system everytime receives a new event (or more events), it reacts by calculat-
ing the new sequence of events (the narrative) and by consequently extending the obtained
result to the previously computed result so to have the complete sequence of events.
The axiomatization of the REC is performed in accord to the SCIFF Abductive Logic [7]
and it is fully declarative axiomatization: operational specifications are not necessary.
The most common tool used to perform specification defined in REC language is the jREC
[102]. It is a JAVA+Prolog-based tool for reasoning upon the dynamics of an event-based
system with respect to an Event Calculus specification. More specifically, jREC dynami-
cally acquires the event occurrences characterizing a running execution of the system and
monitors their effects by updating the evolution of the corresponding fluents.
Despite REC is a valid solution, we chose to not use it since it would have implied the using
of a different tool, and to re-adapt all the specifications for Prolog (REC tool is based on
Prolog); for this reason REC is not suitable for our aim.
4.3 Event Capture in a Dynamic Verification context
In this section we present the monitoring services conceived to automatically detect unde-
sired events and potentially react to them by means of RV. The services have been proposed
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in [34] and they are discussed with respect to a reference WSN-based monitoring system,
depicted in figure 4.2. First we present the services offered to applications, and their role.
Then, we introduce the concept of monitor and describe the monitor components introduced
in the system.
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Figure 4.2: WSN-based system with event monitors
The architecture of the monitoring system is shown in 4.2 and it is structured in four main
parts: Intra-WSN, Gateway Services, Remote Center Services and External Applications.
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4.3.1 Intra-WSN
The Intra-WSN is a particular network constituted by a set of sensor nodes that commu-
nicate among each other and with the gateway. Every node is provided of an running
application that is in charge of to collect all the data of interest and send them to the sink.
4.3.2 Gateway Services
The services offered on the Gateway side (sink) are summarized in the following:
• Sensor Connection: this service provides the communication between a sensor of the
Intra-WSN and the gateway device (i.e. a PDA, a notebook, etc...);
• Sensor Discovery : this service is used to discover the sensors in the Intra-WSN;
• Wifi Discovery : this service is used to verify if there is an access point for the WiFi
connection;
• Wifi Connection: this service provides the WiFi communication to transmit the data
stream to the remote center;
• Cellular Connection: this service provides the cellular communication (GPRS, UMTS,
etc...) to transmit the data stream to the remote center when a WiFi access point is
not available;
• Connection & Discovery : this service is placed at an upper layer and it has the role
to hide to applications the details on the communication technology (Bluetooth, WiFi
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and cellular). Further, it provides technology-agnostic discovery services, which are
then specialized for Bluetooth and WiFi;
• Data Stream: it provides streaming services for sensed data to the application.
4.3.3 Remote Center Services
The services offered for the Remote Center side (desktop) are:
• Connection: this service provides the needed communication interface to receive data
from the Gateway and to send commands to manage the monitoring;
• Stream: it is the service that dialogues with the desktop application of the Remote
Center. It reports the data acquired by the sensors.
4.3.4 External Applications
Finally, we have to consider external application for both side (mobile and desktop). These
applications generally include the GUI used by users on the mobile side (e.g. patients in
case of health monitoring) and by the operators on the fixed side (e.g. foresters in case
of environmental monitoring), and implement application specific data interpretation and
reporting functions.
4.3.5 System Monitors
Once introduced the general services of the WSN-based monitoring system, we enrich the
system with event capture capabilities. To this aim, we introduce the concept of System
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Monitors [34].
In order to start the runtime verification, a system monitor has to be able to detect basic
events that we report in the table 4.1 and that have been presented in the chapter 3.
Table 4.1: Basic events detected by the system monitors
Event Description
Start it occurs when a sensor turns on
Stop it occurs when a sensor turns off
Connect it occurs when a sensor connects to another sensor
Disconnect it occurs when a sensor disconnects from another sensor
Send it occurs when a sensor starts the delivery of a packet to-
wards the sink node
A monitor is a service instantiated on-demand on the basis of the events that have to be
detected. By means of a Monitor Descriptor file (i.e. a XML file), the developer can set the
events that he wants to observe. This file is provided to the Sink that, in turn, dynamically
creates the requested monitors, which run in the background and are managed transparently
from developers.
Specifically, first we introduce the following monitors that are used for detection of the
considered basic events:
• App Monitor
It is deployed on the sensor node and it detects all of the events that occur inside. This
monitor can be considered as a event logger for the node, since it can store its state
before of the failure event, and report it to the gateway when the device is recovered.
Its support is very important for detection of Send and Disconnect (or Connect)
Chapter 4. Dynamic Verification 99
events. When this monitor notices of packet being sent from a node then it detects the
Send event; when it does not receive anymore any packet from a neighboring node then
it detects the Disconnect event. Both events are sent to the Sensor Monitor by means
of the Sensor Connection service. On the basis of packet loss event specification, the
combination of Send and Disconnection events can generate a Packet Loss event (see
section 3.2.2).
• Sensor Monitor
It is deployed on top of the Sensor Discovery and Sensor Connection services. Sensor
and App Monitor are very essential for detecting all basic events. This monitor, in
addition to receive the detected event from the App Monitor, is able to detect Stop (or
Start) event. Let us suppose that every node in the WSN periodically sends a packet
(e.g. one packet every hour); if the system monitor observes that in a certain time
interval does not receive any packet from sensor x then it detects a Stop(x) event. On
the contrary, if starts again to receive packets from a node x that was stopped then
it detects a Start(x) event.
Therefore Sensor and App monitors are helpful to detect the basic events we have defined
and that are summarized in table 4.1.
Then we briefly present the other event monitors present in the WSN-based system; they
aim to detect the failure events that have been presented in the FMEA study (see section
1.4):
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• Extra-WSN Monitor
checks the availability of the WiFi and Cellular connections. It can be efficiently used
to manage the hand off process between the two technologies.
• Data Monitor checks if there are anomalies in the data stream acquired.
• Device Monitor detects mainly if a sensor node is unavailable. In this case, to better
analyze the event it is necessary to require extra information to the Sensor Monitor.
• Gateway Monitor is present both in the Gateway and in the Remote Center. The aim
of this monitor is to check if the gateway operates correctly. The Gateway Monitor in
the Remote Center can only detect if the gateway becomes unavailable but it cannot
know the cause. Instead the Gateway Monitor in the sink side, can keep track of
occurred failure events, such as a freeze, self-shutdown, etc, following for instance the
logging approach proposed in [38].
4.4 Application Scenario
In this paragraph we want to show the dynamic verification technique by means of an
application scenario; the aim is to describe how it is possible to catch events and observe
their effects in a WSN at runtime.
In the figure 4.3, from the left to right, we can see when a event occurs in a wireless sensor
node, by means of a wireless communication, it is detected by a system monitor that runs
on a gateway. The failure event (for instance Stop(n)) is managed by the monitor and
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Figure 4.3: Application scenario in dynamic context
added to the current event trace to perform the reasoning.
The new event trace is included in the structural specification; thus the DECReasoner
receives the structural specifications with the last occurred event and considering the general
correctness specifications performs the reasoning returning a couple of outcomes: i) the
current dependability level of the WSN and ii) the potential critical nodes.
The former informs the user about the WSN dependability at current state calculating
the current metrics (current coverage, current connection resiliency, current data delivery
resiliency and current power consumption). The latter returns a prediction about possible
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criticalities that may occur after the current event.
Moreover in the dynamic verification we have to take in account the changes of the WSN
topology: if a sensor fails, all the packets delivered to it have to be sent to another sensor
and thus the topology, defined in Event Calculus through the predicate Neighbor, has to be
updated at runtime. The dynamic verification technique supports this feature.
The typical components of this scenario are: the Running System (the WSN), the Runtime
Detector (the system monitor that runs on the gateway and the DECReasoner) and the
Recovery Process (the outcomes that inform about criticalities of the WSN).
The engineer is the key figure in the
material progress of the world; he
translates scientific knowledge into
tools, resources, energy and labor to
bring them into the service of man.
Sir Eric Ashby
Chapter 5
The ADVISES Tool
In this chapter we propose a framework to investigate the correctness of the design of a WSN from
the point of view of its dependability, i.e., resilience to undesired events. The framework, named
ADVISES tool, is based on the Event Calculus formalism and it is aimed to simplify the adoption of
our approach by network maintainers. The ADVISES tool allows to specify the target WSN in a user-
friendly way and it is able to generate automatically the Event Calculus specifications used to check
correctness properties and evaluate dependability metrics, such as connection resiliency, coverage
and lifetime. It is able to work at design and runtime. In particular at runtime the ADVISES tool
is like a server that is in waiting for new events coming from the WSN and, performed the reasoning
using the same specifications, is able to do prediction about future criticalities of the WSN.
5.1 Introduction
A Java-based tool, called ADVISES (AutomateDVerIfication of wSn with Event calculuS),
has been designed and implemented to facilitate the application of the two proposed verifi-
cation techniques (static and dynamic).
The goal of the ADVISES tool is to automate the instrumentation of the Event Calculus
scripts to obtain specification for any network.
The ADVISES tool is able to work in both modes: at design time and at runtime; in par-
ticular in the last case it is like a server that is in waiting for new events coming from the
WSN and that are detected by means of a system monitor. The main aim of the ADVISES
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tool is to automatize all the steps that have been considered during the description of the
application scenarios in static and dynamic verification discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
A workflow is presented to show the functioning of the ADVISES tool: from the creation of
the structural specification file for a target WSN to the computation of the dependability
metrics and the sending of information/warning messages.
Next we present the Graphic User Interface (GUI) of the ADVISES tool realized for per-
forming static verification and another one for performing dynamic verification: in the static
we need to select several parameters that in dynamic are not necessary.
5.2 Workflow
In this paragraph we explain the workflow that describes the operation of the ADVISES
tool realized using the Java programming language, the Event Calculus as a formal language
and the DECReasoner to produce the narrative.
Let us observe the workflow represented in figure 5.1 to better understand how the AD-
VISES tool works.
Initially the Pre-processing block receives the operator’s inputs (see table 5.1) and settings,
many of which can be chosen only at design time since at runtime the most of information
comes from the monitored WSN, (i.e. the disconnection probability for every link of the
WSN, the initial battery levels of each node and the initial event trace in case of What-if
scenario). By means of this block the ADVISES tool is able to automatically generate the
Structural Specification file (a file with “.e” extension) with initial conditions in terms of
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Figure 5.1: Workflow
Event Calculus formalism.
The general correctness specifications are included in the structural specification file which
is then provided by the ADVISES tool as input to the DECReasoner, which produces the
outcome as the result of the reasoning (Reasoning block). The DECReasoner generates
the output (the narrative) in a single textual file (Outcome) or in a set of them, when we
perform Robustness Checking.
The Metric Processing block analyzes the outcome produced by the previous block and cal-
culates the coverage, the connection resiliency, the data delivery resiliency and the power
consumption. The metrics are calculated on the basis of their definitions and considering
the fluent values produced by the DECReasoner at each timepoint for each model.
Finally the ADVISES tool sends messages to the operator in order to inform or alert him
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Table 5.1: Tool Inputs
Input Description
Topology File A file with *.txt extension (textual file). It is a topol-
ogy file in which links between nodes are represented.
Number of timepoints User has to indicate the observation time of behavior
of the considered WSN. It is a positive integer number.
Number of sensors User has to indicate the number of the sensors that
compose the WSN topology. It is a positive integer
number.
Number of packets It is the number of packets that every node can send
to the sink node. It is a positive integer number.
Number of failures It is the number of failures which the user considers
in order to know the robustness level of the WSN. It
is a positive integer number.
Battery capacity It is the maximum battery capacity of a sensor ex-
pressed in Joule. It is a positive integer number.
TX/RX energy It is the energy expressed in µJoule necessary for every
node to perform a TX/RX operation. It is a positive
integer number.
Threshold It is the threshold value associated to the coverage
and data delivery resiliency metrics. It is a percentage
value within the range 0-100.
about WSN robustness. In particular in case of dynamic verification, the ADVISES tool is
able to make prediction about possible future critical nodes and thus to suggest operator
to make some change at the WSN topology.
5.3 ADVISES Tool GUI
Since the static and dynamic verification do not require the same number of input param-
eters, we present a GUI for static verification and another GUI for dynamic verification.
The ADVISES tool GUI for static verification is rich and it needs several parameters like
the number of packets, the number of failures (for performing the robustness checking at
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design time), the battery capacity value of a node, the initial event trace, etc.
The ADVISES tool GUI for dynamic verification is simpler because it works on the basis
of the events that receives from the WSN.
5.3.1 ADVISES Tool for Static Verification
By means of the GUI shown in figure 5.2, an user can simply specify i) the topology of
the target WSN, using a connectivity matrix, ii) the formal correctness specifications (for
checking isolation events, packet losses and battery exhaustion), iii) the temporal window
size to consider, in terms of the number of timepoints, iv) the number of packets that each
sensor can send, v) the number of failures (in case of coverage robustness checking), vi) the
battery capacity of a sensor (in Joule) and the needed energy for RX/TX operations (in
µJoule), vii) the metrics to calculate (for coverage and data delivery resiliency it is neces-
sary also the threshold value), viii) the channel model (in case of data delivery robustness
checking), ix) the initial battery level, x) the initial event trace (to perform what-if scenario
analysis).
The GUI is subdivided by five panels.
In the first panel there is a message that reports the application title. The Topology section
is dedicated at the loading/creating of a network topology. The user has to select a topology
file that can be found by means of Open button or created on-the-fly using the New topology
button. Show topology button allows to display the selected topology in a separate frame.
In this file links between nodes are represented.
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Figure 5.2: ADVISES GUI at design time
Selected the topology, let us analyze the Settings section panel. By means of this panel the
user can set the several parameters (numbers of timepoint, of packets, of failures, battery
capacity and TX/RX energy) that will be considered for the static verification; the number
of sensors is automatically calculated by the ADVISES tool. Moreover the user can choose
what general correctness specifications (Isolation, Packet Loss and Power Consumption)
are necessary for a particular verification and whether to perform a what-if analysis or a
robustness checking: this option helps to avoid that user can do wrong choices (e.g. inser-
tion of the number of failures in case of what-if analysis or choice of an initial event trace
in case of robustness checking).
In the Metrics section, the user with a tick chooses the desired metrics and if he selects
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coverage or data delivery resiliency he has to write the percentage values (default value is
50 ).
In the fourth panel (Actions) the ADVISES tool presents the possible steps that user can
perform.
• Channel Model
Pressing this button the users can select the disconnection probability for every link of
the WSN topology choosing a percentage value (0%=never disconnection; 100%=ever
disconnection). This action is disabled if user wants to perform What-if analysis or
robustness checking but without considering the packet loss. In fact the channel model
is defined to randomly generate disconnection failures in order to verify the packet
loss event.
Figure 5.3a shows an example of the dialog associated with this button.
• Initial Battery Level
Pressing this button the users can set the initial battery level for every node of
the WSN topology choosing a percentage value (0%=completely discharged node;
100%=completely charged node). This action is disabled if user wants to perform
experiments without considering the Power Consumption specification in Settings
section.
Figure 5.3b shows an example of the dialog associated with this button.
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(a) Channel Model (b) Initial Battery Level
Figure 5.3: Channel Model and Initial Battery level frames
• New Event Trace
Pressing this button the users can set the initial event trace that could occur in the
WSN. This action is disabled if user wants to perform robustness checking: the initial
event trace is considered only in case of What-if analysis.
Figure 5.4 shows an example of dialog associated with the New Trace Event button;
note that the dialog is so smart to guide the user in the adding new events avoiding
wrong values (i.e. a link for a Start or Stop event or a node for a Disconnection event).
Figure 5.4: Example of an Initial Event Trace specified by the user
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• Create EC file
Pressing this button the ADVISES tool automatically generates an Event Calculus
file in the same directory of the topology file. This file wraps the general correctness
specifications chosen in the Settings section and the structural specifications. Once
EC file is created, it is displayed in a separate frame.
Figure 5.5 shows an example of the frame generated by the ADVISES tool.
Figure 5.5: Example of a EC file generated by the ADVISES tool
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• Run
To obtain the output of the DECReasoner the user has to press this button; analyz-
ing the fluent values contained in the outcome produced by the DECReasoner, the
ADVISES tool computes the desired dependability metrics. A pop-up message will
appear on the screen in order to notify user the end of the computation.
Finally in the Log messages panel, the ADVISES tool reports all the useful messages in
order to perform the user if some error occurs.
5.3.2 ADVISES Tool for Dynamic Verification
Ultimated the design phase of a WSN, however it is necessary to monitor the robustness of
the network at runtime. Before to present the GUI for dynamic verification, it is necessary
to know how the ADVISES tool can work at runtime.
Figure 5.6 shows an application schema.
When a failure occurs in a wireless sensor node, it is detected, by means of a wireless com-
munication, by a system monitor that runs on a gateway. The event failure (for instance
Stop(n)) is managed by the monitor and sent to the ADVISES Tool that is in listening on
a port ready to receive events and start reasoning.
The ADVISES tool, received the output from the DECReasoner, calculates the selected
dependability metrics to establish both the current status of the WSN and the robustness
and therefore a possible reaction in the case of further failures.
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Figure 5.6: Use of the ADVISES Tool at runtime
Then, verified the obtained metrics values with the thresholds set by the user, the ADVISES
tool sends messages to network maintainer which may be purely informative or alerts in
case these values are under the desired threshold.
Therefore the ADVISES tool “advises” the network maintainer of problems related to the
network and reports its critical points.
The flow chart in figure 5.7 describes the ADVISES operating at runtime. Once started,
the ADVISES Tool is in server mode and in waiting for events coming from the WSN
(Waiting for events); if a new event is detected (New detected event? ) then it receives this
event (Receiving event) and automatically updates the sequence (Updating event sequence)
of received events and generates the EC file in order to perform the reasoning with the DE-
CReasoner (Reasoning). Finally it calculates the current metrics and performs robustness
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checking to predict the future criticalities (Current metrics and RC prediction). After the
last step, the ADVISES tool continues to work waiting next detected events.
Figure 5.7: Flow chart of the ADVISES operating at runtime
For this purpose we have realized another GUI of the ADVISES Tool in order to receive
events from a WSN in real-time detected through a system monitor and to start the runtime
verification evaluating both current and future criticalities.
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Figure 5.8: ADVISES GUI at runtime
Figure 5.8 shows this GUI.
By means of this GUI, a user can simply specify i) the topology of the target WSN, using
a connectivity matrix, ii) the temporal window size to consider, in terms of the number
of timepoints, iii) the metrics to calculate (for coverage and data delivery resiliency it is
necessary also the threshold value).
Even this GUI is subdivided by five panels but with a different goal; for example the Actions
section disappears and replaced by the Log events panel since user does not have to choose
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anything but only to observing the behavior of the WSN.
The first panel is identical to the GUI for static verification. Before to start the dynamic
verification, the user has to set the topology of the WSN to monitor.
Selected the topology, let us analyze the Settings panel. In dynamic verification the number
of sensors is automatically calculated by the ADVISES tool and the user has just to set the
number of timepoints to consider: in this context this value represents the time range for
observing the effects of the current event.
The Metrics panel is identical to the GUI for static verification. In the Log events panel the
ADVISES tool reports all the events coming from the WSN and that have been detected
by the system monitor.
Finally in the Log messages panel, the ADVISES tool reports all the performed computa-
tions about current state of the WSN and the risks that may affect its robustness. Also
there are useful messages in order to perform the user if some error occurs.
5.4 Metrics computation
By means of a parser that analyzes the traces produced by the DECReasoner, the ADVISES
tool calculates the dependability metrics.
The computation of Coverage and Connection Resiliency depends on a threshold parame-
ter, to be indicated as a percentage by the user in the GUI (see the “Threshold” text field in
the Metrics section in figure 5.2). The threshold expresses the fraction of failed and isolated
nodes that the user can tolerate, given its design constraints. For instance, over a WSN
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of 20 nodes, a threshold set to 100% means that all the 20 nodes have to be connected,
whereas 50% means that the user can tolerate at most 10 isolated nodes.
Considering the threshold value, we calculate the Coverage analyzing the IsReachable(sensor)
and IsAlive(sensor) fluents found to be true in the event trace produced by the reasoner:
if a -IsReachable(x) or a -IsAlive(sensor) fluent is true in the event trace, this means that
node x became isolated or it stopped. For example in the case of coverage at 50%, for
a WSN with 7 nodes, there is coverage when at least 4 nodes are not isolated (i.e., they
are reachable). Hence, as soon as 4 different nodes are no reachable nor alive (looking at
the fluents), the network is not covered anymore. The coverage can be then evaluated as
the interval [0, t], being t the timepoint of the last failure or disconnection event before the
isolation (e.g., the timepoint of the event that caused the isolation of a number of nodes
exceeding the threshold).
The Connection Resiliency can then be evaluated as the number of failure and disconnec-
tion events (namely, Stop(sensor) and Disconnect(sensor, from sensor) events) that happen
within the coverage interval, excluding the last failure/disconnection event, that is, the one
that actually leads the number of isolated nodes to overcome the threshold. For example, if
we have coverage in the interval [0, 6], and during this period 3 failure/disconnection events
can be counted, than the Connection Resiliency is 2, that is, the WSN was able to tolerate
2 failures or disconnections while preserving more than 50% of the nodes connected.
Even the computation of the Data Delivery Resiliency depends on a threshold parameter
indicated by the user as the percentage value. By means of this percentage value, the user
can express the fraction of the number of packets that can be lost. For instance, over a
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WSN of 30 nodes, a sensors sends 10 packets; if this threshold is equal to 60%, it means that
at most 4 packets can be lost. Considering the threshold value, the ADVISES tool calcu-
lates the data delivery resiliency analyzing the IsInDelivery(pkt,source) fluent in the event
trace produced by the reasoner: if a +IsInDelivery(pkt,source) fluent is true in the event
trace, this means that a packet has been sent by a sensor; if a -IsInDelivery(pkt,source)
fluent is true, this means that a packet has been received by the sink node. If the number
of instances where the fluent -IsInDelivery(pkt,source) is equal to the number of instances
where the fluent +IsInDelivery(pkt,source), then every packet has been correctly received
by the sink node, otherwise this means that some packet is lost. As soon as the fraction
of lost packets becomes lower than the threshold value then the ADVISES tool verifies the
number of failures (Stop and Disconnect events) occurred; the number of the occurred fail-
ures represents the value of the data delivery resiliency.
Power consumption is computed analyzing the BatteryLevel (level, sensor) fluent. For each
timepoint, if a +BatteryLevel(level,sensor) fluent is true then the ADVISES tool updates
the battery consumption of the related sensor. After the last timepoint, for each sensor the
ADVISES tool computes the percentage of power consumption. If the behavior of nodes is
known (e.g., each node send packets periodically, with a known period), this information
can be used to evaluate the lifetime of the network as the time when the number of alive
and not isolated nodes falls below the coverage threshold.
There are three principal means of
acquiring knowledge: observation of
nature, reflection, and experimentation.
Observation collects facts; reflection
combines them; experimentation
verifies the result of that combination.
Denis Diderot
Chapter 6
Case Studies
In this chapter we report the results from five representative case studies. The first two case studies
are based on what-if scenario analysis, and their aim is to evaluate if the reasoning performed by the
DECReasoner on our specifications is correct. They also aim to show how the ADVISES tool can be
used to verify the behavior of a WSN in a precise scenario at design time. The third and fourth are
based on robustness checking. In these cases, the aim is to show how the proposed approach can be
helpful to analyze a design and drive engineers’ choices. Finally the last shows how the ADVISES
tool works at runtime.
6.1 Case study 1 (what-if analysis): A Wireless Body Sensor
Network
6.1.1 Scenario
As first case study for what-if analysis let us consider a wireless body sensor network real-
ized by Quwaider et al. in [119] shown in figure 6.1a. This Wireless Body Sensor Network
(WBSN) is constructed by mounting seven sensor nodes attached on two ankles, two thighs,
two upper-arms and one in the waist area. Each node consists of a 900 MHz Mica2Dot
MOTE (running Tiny-OS operating system).
In figure 6.1b it is reported the related node tree graph in which the arrows indicate the
relationship between a couple of nodes (i.e. node 2 depends on node 1, node 3 and 4 depend
119
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(a) WBSN scenario (b) WBSN topology
Figure 6.1: WBSN case study
on node 2, etc.). We only have to load the topology file in the GUI, to allow the axioms
defined for correctness properties to be interpreted and automatically created for the given
topology.
We suppose that the following basic events occur: Disconnect(5 , 3) at timepoint 1 and
Stop(4) at timepoint 3. For a coverage threshold set at 50%, we should observe a coverage
interval equals to [0, 3] (i.e., when node 4 stops at time point 3, 4 nodes are not reachable,
namely 4, 5, 6 and 7), and a connection resiliency equals to 1 (i.e., only the disconnection
event is tolerated).
6.1.2 Results
Figure 6.2 shows the loading of the topology for this case study. To perform the analysis,
we charge an initial event trace in the ADVISES tool (figure 6.3); the user has to select the
timepoint, the event and the node (in case of Start/Stop/Send event) or the couple of nodes
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Figure 6.2: Topology loading with ADVISES tool
(in case of Disconnect/Connect event) to include in the event trace. This is translated in a
list of Happens predicates that specify nodes and timepoints in which a given event occurs.
Figure 6.3: Topology loading with ADVISES tool
The completion statement specifies that a predicate symbol (i.e. Happens) should be subject
to predicate completion.
Listing 6.1: Initial event trace for a WBSN
1 Happens(Disconnect(5 , 3),1).
2 Happens(Stop(4),3).
3
4 completion Happens 
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Finally, in the last part we consider ranges of values for sensors and timepoints.
In this case we know that the network is composed by 7 nodes and we want to observe what
it could happen in 10 timepoints.
Listing 6.2: Parameters for a WBSN
1 range sensor 1 7
2 range time 0 10 
Listing 6.3 reports the outcome (the narrative) produced by the DECReasoner when invoked
by the ADVISES tool. The event trace confirms our expectations. We can observe that
after the stop of node 4, nodes 6 and 7 becomes not reachable. Considering that node 5
was already not reachable, this means that a total of 4 nodes are isolated. The coverage
is computed as the time point of the last failure event causing such isolation, that is 3.
Consequently, the connection resiliency is computed by counting the number of failure and
disconnection events in the interval [0, 3], excluding the last event; hence, it is equal to 1.
Listing 6.3: Outcome of the DECReasoner for a WBSN
0
1
Happens(Disconnect(5, 3), 1).
2
-IsLinked(5, 3).
Happens(Isolate(5), 2).
3
-IsReachable(5).
Happens(Stop(4), 3).
4
-IsAlive(4).
Happens(Isolate(6), 4).
5
-IsReachable(6).
Happens(Isolate(7), 5).
6
-IsReachable(7).
Chapter 6. Case Studies 123
7
8
9
10 
6.2 Case study 2 (what-if analysis): A more complex WSN
6.2.1 Scenario
As second case study, we consider the topology of a WSN that has been realized in our
laboratory using TMOTE sensors.
Figure 6.4: Topology of a more complex WSN
This WSN (figure 6.4) is constructed by mounting ten sensor nodes. Node 1 is the sink
of the network. Each node consists of a TMOTE SKY XM1000 (Tiny-OS and ContikiOS
compatible) which follows the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
We are interested to evaluate the behavior of the network, in terms of coverage, connection
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resiliency, and data delivery resiliency, when the following sequence of basic events occurs:
Send(1,5) at timepoint 1, Send(1,9) at timepoint 2, Stop(4) at timepoint 4 and Discon-
nect(3 , 1) at timepoint 7.
For a coverage threshold set at 70%, we should observe that coverage interval is equals to
[0, 7] (i.e., when node 3 disconnects from node 1 at time point 7, 4 nodes are not reachable,
namely 3, 4, 8 and 9), and a connection resiliency equals to 1 (i.e., only the disconnection
event is tolerated).
For a data delivery resiliency threshold set at 60%, we should observe that the packets sent
by node 5 and node 9 are received by the sink without being lost.
6.2.2 Results
The initial event trace produced by the ADVISES tool is given in Listing 6.4.
Listing 6.4: Initial event trace for a more complex WSN
1 Happens(Send(1,5),1).
2 Happens(Send(1,9),2).
3 Happens(Stop(4),4).
4 Happens(Disconnect(3 , 1),7).
5
6 completion Happens 
The ADVISES tool generates the values for the range of sensors and timepoints, again
analyzing user inputs. In this case, we know that the network is composed by 10 nodes that
can send al most 1 packet and we want to observe what it could happen in 10 timepoints.
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Listing 6.5: Parameters for a more complex WSN
1 range sensor 1 10
2 range pkt 1 1
3 range time 0 10 
Also in this case, the outcome produced by the DECReasoner (see listing 6.6) reports the
event trace by means of which we can validate our assumptions. In fact, we can observe that
when node 4 stops, there are still 9 reachable nodes. When there is a disconnection between
nodes 3 and 1, there are 6 reachable nodes. For this reason the coverage is 7 because in the
interval [0, 7] the covered nodes are 9 on 10 (90%); the connection resiliency is equal to 1.
Finally, the data delivery resiliency is 100%; the packets sent by node 5 and node 9 are
correctly received by the sink.
Listing 6.6: Outcome of the DECReasoner for a more complex WSN
0
1
Happens(Forward(1, 5, 5, 2), 1).
Happens(Send(1, 5), 1).
2
+IsInDelivery(1, 5).
+IsOnChannel(1, 5, 5, 2).
Happens(Catch(1, 5, 2, 5), 2).
Happens(Forward(1, 9, 9, 3), 2).
Happens(Send(1, 9), 2).
3
-IsOnChannel(1, 5, 5, 2).
+IsInDelivery(1, 9).
+IsOnChannel(1, 9, 9, 3).
Happens(Catch(1, 9, 3, 9), 3).
Happens(Forward(1, 5, 2, 1), 3).
4
-IsOnChannel(1, 9, 9, 3).
+IsOnChannel(1, 5, 2, 1).
Happens(Catch(1, 5, 1, 2), 4).
Happens(Forward(1, 9, 3, 1), 4).
Happens(Receive(1, 5), 4).
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Happens(Stop(4), 4).
5
-IsAlive(4).
-IsInDelivery(1, 5).
-IsOnChannel(1, 5, 2, 1).
+IsOnChannel(1, 9, 3, 1).
Happens(Catch(1, 9, 1, 3), 5).
Happens(Receive(1, 9), 5).
6
-IsInDelivery(1, 9).
-IsOnChannel(1, 9, 3, 1).
7
Happens(Disconnect(3, 1), 7).
8
-IsLinked(3, 1).
Happens(Isolate(3), 8).
9
-IsReachable(3).
Happens(Isolate(8), 9).
Happens(Isolate(9), 9).
10
-IsReachable(8).
-IsReachable(9). 
6.3 Case study 3 (robustness checking): Is it worth to add a
node?
6.3.1 Scenario
As a first case study for robustness checking let us consider a simple WSN with 6 nodes
(Figure 6.5). This topology is commonly adopted to monitor a linear structure, such as a
tunnel or an oil pipeline. From the figure, it is intuitive to conclude that node 2 represents
the most critical dependability bottleneck for this topology, since it has to route the packets
from all other nodes to the sink.
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Figure 6.5: WSN with line topology
The simplicity of the topology allows to reason on dependability bottlenecks, and on poten-
tial improvements. In particular, the objective of the case study is to quantify the benefits,
in terms of connection resiliency, of adding one extra node (see figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6: WSN with extra node in line topology
6.3.2 Results
In order to obtain the results, shown in table 6.1, we have considered in both topologies a
reasoning performed on 10 timepoints, a coverage threshold value equal to 70% (5 reachable
nodes), and a number of failures from 1 to 4.
Table 6.1: Results of simple linear topology
Outcome
Simple linear topology
6 sensors 6 sensors + 1 extra
No. of Failures 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Connection Resiliency 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Percentage of Cases 20% - - - 66% 24% - -
For both topologies we report the number of failures, the connection resiliency, and the
percentage of the cases in which the connection resiliency is not 0.
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For example in simple linear topology (without extra node), exploring all of the cases in
which 1 failure occurs, we have connection resiliency equal to 1 in 20% of the cases. In
the other cases, the coverage is below 70%. If 2 failures occur, we have no cases in which
coverage is above 70% and so, the maximum connection resiliency level achievable is 1. This
confirms numerically that the topology is extremely fragile and susceptible to failures in the
majority of cases when undesired events occur.
If we add an extra node then we gain benefits because we triple the chances (66%) to have
connection resiliency with coverage >70% in case of 1 failure, and we have coverage upper
than threshold value also when 2 failures occur (in the 24% of the cases). Hence, in this
case the maximum connection resiliency level is 2. In this way we can assert that adding a
node (accounting for 17% of extra cost) in the proximity of the sink allows to significantly
boost the robustness of the WSN, by triplicating the chances of survival in case of 1 failure,
and by doubling the maximum connection resiliency achievable.
6.4 Case study 4 (robustness checking): Checking robustness
in harsh environments
6.4.1 Scenario
In this case study we consider the WSN with 8 nodes reported in figure 6.7. In particular we
want to observe how the WSN reacts and consequently, how the percentage of data delivery
changes with different disconnection probabilities. This is useful to check the robustness of
the WSN in different deployment scenarios, e.g., from environments with a good channel
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quality (for instance, an outdoor scenario in good whether conditions, with no interferences)
to harsh environments (such as, indoor scenario with fading due to obstacles and walls and
electromagnetic interferences due to the presence of other wireless devices).
Specifically, we analyze the percentage of delivered packets when every link has a probability
of disconnection ranging from 5% to 40% with step 5%. We expect that, the more the
disconnection probability grows, the more failures occur, and the less is likely that a packet
is delivered to the sink. In particular, we want to check under which operational conditions
the network is still able to deliver more than 50% of packets to the sink.
Figure 6.7: WSN topology with 8 nodes
6.4.2 Results
The graph in figure 6.8 shows the results of the study, where O.F. (Occurred Failures) rep-
resents the number of the occurred failures and D. Pkt. (Delivered Packets) the percentage
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of delivered packets. Both the values are reported as a function of the disconnection prob-
ability from 5% to 40%. Each point of the graph is obtained by repeating the experiment
3 times, letting the ADVISES tool generate different random sequences starting from the
disconnection probability set by the user. For this reason, each point represents a mean
value, and also standard deviation bars are reported.
Figure 6.8: Results of the case study
From the graph, we can observe the expected inverse relationship between the trend of the
occurred failures and the trend of delivered packets: when the probability of disconnection
increases, also the number of the failures increases, whereas the number of the delivered
packets decreases.
It is interesting to observe a certain resilience of the network for disconnection probability
values ranging from 20% to 35%. In this range it seems that, even if the number of failures
keeps increasing as expected, the network is redundant enough to tolerate them. Hence the
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percentage of delivered packets remains the same, and we need to stress the network up to
a 40% of disconnection probability to observe a more significant loss in the percentage of
delivered packets.
Considering instead our requirement on checking up to which conditions the WSN is able
to deliver more than 50% of packets to the sink, we can observe that this requirement is
satisfied up to a disconnection probability of 15%, and a number of failures below 5. This
means that the data delivery resiliency for this network is 5 (with the threshold set to 50%),
and that the WSN is able to conform to expectations only if deployed in an environment
where quality of channels is such that the disconnection probability of links does not over-
come the critical level of 15%.
6.5 Case study 5 (runtime verification): WSN robustness
checking at runtime
6.5.1 Scenario
In the last case study we consider the WSN topology composed by 8 nodes and reported in
figure 6.9.
We want to verify this WSN at runtime and thus we consider a Runtime Verification sce-
nario (illustrated in figure 6.10). We see how a failure that occurs in node 5 (Stop(5)) is
notified to a monitor that is running on the gateway. The monitor, received the event, sends
it to the tool which starts the reasoning by means of the DECReasoner.
Then we suppose that Stop(7) event occurs and it is notified again to a monitor in charge
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Figure 6.9: WSN topology in dynamic scenario
Figure 6.10: Scenario with Stop(5) event
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of sending the event to the ADVISES tool (Figure 6.11).
Figure 6.11: Scenario with Stop(7) event
We are interested to detect the criticalities of the WSN at runtime when a sequence of
events occurs.
For this scenario no initial event trace has to be defined and no channel model or number of
possible occurring failures. The ADVISES is in running and initially is in a sleeping phase
until it receives an event from the system monitor.
For a coverage threshold set at 65%, we should observed that when it occurs the first event
(Stop(5)), there would be 7 reachable nodes and thus the coverage would be higher than
the threshold value; moreover it would be necessary to control the nodes 2, 3, 4 because if
they failed there would be at most 5 reachable nodes and the coverage would go under the
desired threshold.
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Then when it occurs the second event (Stop(7)) there would be 6 reachable nodes and thus
the coverage still would be higher than the threshold value; even in this case it would be
necessary to continue controlling the nodes 2, 3, 4.
Moreover in this case study, for every received event, the ADVISES tool performs forecast-
ing at 2 and 3 levels (that is performing robustness checking with two and three subsequent
failures included the current event). In this way the network maintainer can know not only
the next critical nodes but also the nodes that could become dangerous in a second moment
and thus intervening with changes (e.g. adding a node) to avoid undesired consequences.
6.5.2 Results
To test the runtime behavior of the ADVISES tool, the events are emulated and sent to the
tool by means of a simple java-based program (figure 6.12).
(a) Emulator for generic sending of events
(b) Emulation by means of Castalia file
Figure 6.12: Java-based emulator
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It has been realized with a two functionalities: the first one consists in the manually gener-
ating Stop and Send events (figure 6.12a); the second one in extracting, from a file obtained
with Castalia simulator, a real sequence of events that may occur in the target WSN file
(figure 6.12b). Even if we use an emulator, the server-side interface of the tool does not
change and its behavior would be the same even if the events were sent by a WSN.
ADVISES, having loaded the topology file, knows the WSN topology and it is listening in
server mode; it just receives Stop(5) event, it automatically generates the EC file and starts
the reasoning invoking the DECReasoner (figure 6.13); the received event is annotated in
the Log events panel.
Figure 6.13: ADVISES GUI in dynamic verification
The first result is shown in figure 6.14: the ADVISES tool is able to inform the network
maintainer about current robustness of the network: for a coverage level set to 65% we have
current coverage at 88%.
After this result the ADVISES tool starts the computation about possible critical nodes;
it performs a reasoning to detect the next failure (2-level forecasting) and then the next
couple of failures (3-level forecasting) that could cause a coverage value under the threshold
value. Results are shown in figure 6.15 and 6.16 respectively.
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Figure 6.14: ADVISES GUI receives first event from the WSN
Figure 6.15: 2-level forecasting with first detected event
Figure 6.16: 3-level forecasting with first detected event
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From these figures we can see that nodes 2, 3, 4 are particularly critical: if it occurs a
failure in one of these nodes, the WSN is not dependable anymore on the basis of the set
constraints. Moreover from these results we also know all the sequences of two events that
can be dangerous: for example it is true that if it occurs Stop(6) after Stop(5), the coverage
still is good but if it occurs Stop(6)Stop(4) the effect can be dangerous.
This information can help the network maintainer to making modifications at the WSN in
order to improve the its quality and the robustness; for instance, to add a redundant node
between nodes 2 and 3 after the failure of node 5. Given these results, the ADVISES tool
becomes again in a sleeping state ready to intervene in case of next detected event.
Figure 6.17: ADVISES GUI receives second event from the WSN
To conclude let us observe the scenario after the Stop(5) event; in the WSN the Stop(7)
event occurs. Figure 6.17 shows the GUI updated with the new event and the result about
new current coverage: the coverage value is decreased from 88% to 75% but it still is higher
than the threshold value. The reader can note that in Log event panel it is reported the
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sequence of the events detected.
Conclusions
This thesis addressed the problem of the dependability assessment of WSNs with formal
methods. Assessing the dependability of WSNs is a crucial task since this kind of net-
works are more and more used into critical application scenarios where the level of trust
becomes an important factor; depending on application scenarios, different dependability
requirements can be defined, such as, node lifetime, network resiliency, and coverage of the
monitoring area. From a preliminary analysis it emerged the need of verifying a WSN at
design time in order to increase the confidence about the robustness of designed solutions
before putting it into operation and the need of monitoring a WSN during operation in
order to avoid unexpected results or dangerous effects and thus to perform what in the
literature is defined continuous monitoring.
We have seen that formal methods are widely adopted in the literature to verify the correct-
ness of a system specification but until now not much applied for checking of dependability
properties in the WSNs.
To address these issues, the research activity dealt with the definition of formal specifica-
tions used for the behavioral checking of WSN based systems in static and runtime phases;
a set of correctness specifications applied to a generic WSN has been defined using Event
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Calculus as formal language since the behavior of a WSN can be characterized in terms of
an event flow (e.g. a node turns on, a packet is sent, a node stops due to failure, etc.) and
the Event Calculus formalism allowed to easily specify the system in terms of events.
In particular, the main contributions of this dissertation have been: i) the definition of the
formal specification of WSN correctness as two logical sets: a general correctness specifica-
tion, valid independently of the particular WSN under study, and a structural specification
related to the properties of the target WSN (e.g., number of nodes, topology, channel qual-
ity, initial battery charge), designed to be generated automatically, ii) the use of specific
WSN dependability metrics, such as connection resiliency, coverage, data delivery resiliency
and lifetime, as drivers to guide design choices, iii) the realization of two types of verifi-
cation techniques exploiting the same set of formal specifications (static verification and
dynamic verification), iv) the development of an automated verification tool, named AD-
VISES (AutomateD VerIfication of wSn with Event calculu textbfS), to simplify the adop-
tion of the proposed approach and v) the presentation of the usefulness of the approach in
the context of case studies, to show how the proposed framework and tool can help system
engineers to take decisions upon key design and runtime questions.
The ADVISES tool has been conceived: i) to operate in double mode: static and dynamic,
ii) to automatically generate the structural specifications given the properties of a tar-
get WSN (e.g. topology), iii) to perform the reasoning starting from the correctness and
structural specifications, iv) to compute dependability metrics starting from the event trace
produced by the reasoner, and v) to receive events in real-time from a WSN to start runtime
verification and to evaluate current and future criticalities.
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Other than providing specific considerations on the presented case studies, in this chapter
we discuss on some lessons which have been learned and that can be reasonably considered
when performing the dependability assessment of WSNs with formal methods.
Lessons Learned
Static and Dynamic Verification Using Same Specifications
The first main lesson learned from this dissertation has been the proposal of a methodology
that merges static and dynamic verification exploiting a single set of correctness properties
and one tool as mean for adapting this methodology for any WSN.
Hence by means of a single set of correctness specifications for WSNs (in the Event Calculus
formalism) we have been able to perform three different techniques: What-if Analysis, Ro-
bustness Checking and Runtime Verification. The first two for static verification, the third
for dynamic verification. This has been possible by relying on a single tool (ADVISES)
able to automatically generate on the basis of a target WSN complete specifications (gen-
eral correctness specifications + structural specification ) and from these calculate desired
dependability metrics.
Considerations About Case Studies
The effectiveness of the approach has been shown in the context of five case studies. They
allowed to illustrate that the reasoning performed on the defined specification produced re-
sults which are consistent with our expectations. More importantly, they have shown how
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the results have been useful to drive design choices (e.g., whether is worth to add a node)
and to check limit operational conditions (the minimum channel quality required to let the
WSN work to expectations).
In particular in the first two case studies we have proved the validation of the general cor-
rectness specifications of WSNs defined in this thesis; it has also been an opportunity to
prove the correct operating of the proposed tool that automatizes our methodology and to
comment the outcome generated by the DECReasoner.
More interesting results have been obtained with the last three case studies.
Firstly, the third case study has allowed us to show one of the capacities of the robustness
checking technique performed with our methodology. It is possible to perform static veri-
fication in order to study possible improvements in a WSN. In fact in this case study we
have seen that, starting from a simple linear topology, adding a node between the node 4
and the sink node has been advantageous since we gained benefits: we tripled the chances
(66%) to have connection resiliency with coverage >70% in case of 1 failure, and we have
had coverage upper than threshold value also when 2 failures occurred (in the 24% of the
cases). Hence, the maximum connection resiliency level has gone from 1 to 2. In this way
we have asserted that adding a node (accounting for 17% of extra cost) in the proximity
of the sink allowed to significantly boost the robustness of the WSN, by triplicating the
chances of survival in case of 1 failure, and by doubling the maximum connection resiliency
achievable.
In the fourth case study we have studied the robustness of a WSN in which every node
periodically sent a packet towards the sink node. We have observed that the WSN has been
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able to deliver more than 50% of packets to the sink keeping a disconnection probability
lower of 15% and tolerating a number of failures below 5. This meant that the data delivery
resiliency for this network is 5 (with the threshold set to 50%), and that the WSN has to
be deployed in an environment where quality of channels is such that the disconnection
probability of links does not overcome the critical level of 15%.
The fifth and last case study has shown the runtime verification technique performed by
means of Event Calculus without using external tools and languages (like Reactive Event
Calculus). We have seen how a generic event coming from the WSN (i.e Stop(5)) is detected
by a monitor that is running on the gateway and sent to the ADVISES tool which starts the
reasoning by means of the DECReasoner. The aim of this case study has been to describe
practically the dynamic verification technique. From an event we are able to have several
outcomes, such as the current critical nodes that can compromise the robustness of the
network, the next critical nodes that have to be particularly monitored.
On the Criticality of the Reasoning Time
The definition of the general correctness specifications (for isolation, packet loss and bat-
tery exhaustion event) has been an hard and long task since we had to write their informal
descriptions in Event Calculus formalism, to realize some initial simple scenario and veri-
fy/test them by means of the DECReasoner.
Among them we found particular criticality of the packet loss event specification and thus
battery exhaustion event specification (because the last one is linked to the packet loss
event). While the reasoning performed on the specification for the isolation event took few
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time during the reasoning, the reasoning performed on the specification for packet loss (and
for battery exhaustion) took much more time, producing the desired output anyway.
This is due to a more complex logic that characterizes this specification and surely it is
necessary to review it in order to improve the reasoning time and so the performances of
the proposed methodology.
Moreover due to long reasoning time we had to consider WSNs with topologies composed
by few nodes (about 10); performing some tests, both with 100 and 30 nodes we observed
that the DECReasoner took much time without returning the outcome but an error message
that at the moment is not documented; after several tests we asserted that the limit of the
nodes that can be considered is about 10 (considering health monitoring scenario it is a
reasonable number for a WBSN that is characterized usually from not more of 5/6 nodes).
Probably the long reasoning time depends on our defined specifications that may be opti-
mized in the future work.
Next Steps
This dissertation demonstrated that it is possible to assess the dependability of WSNs by
means of the formal methods in particular Event Calculus formalism.
However, the proposed approach has also to resolve some design challenges (criticalities of
the reasoning time) as documented in the last point of the lessons learned. As future steps,
we want to review all the general correctness specifications optimizing them and improving
the reasoning time in order to apply the approach at WSN with high number of nodes.
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Alternatively we can suppose to follow the divide et impera concept: to subdivide the WSN
in subnets and to apply the approach for each subnet thus to collect all the obtained data.
Moreover we want to apply the entire methodology to a real WSN, to define new metrics of
dependability not oriented towards the WSNs but considering the failure events that may
occur in other components of the WSN-based systems.
Finally another aim is to adopt all of this approach (static and dynamic verification with
formal methods) in completely different scenarios: for example adopting the approach for
gesture and activity recognition for patients with cognitive disorders.
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